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Summary: This paper reviews the research on the impacts of alcohol taxation outcomes such as heavy drinking 
and mortality. Where data availability permits, reviewed studies are replicated and reanalyzed. Despite weaknesses 
in the majority of studies, and despite seeming disagreements among the more credible ones—ones based on 
natural experiments—we can be reasonably confident that taxing alcohol reduces drinking in general and problem 
drinking in particular.  The larger and cleaner the underlying natural experiment, the more apt a study is to detect 
impacts on drinking. Estimates from the highest-powered study settings, such as in Alaska in 2002 and Finland in 
2004, suggest an elasticity of mortality with respect to price of −1 to −3. A 10% price increase in the US would, 
according to this estimate, save 2,000−6,000 lives and 48,000−130,000 years of life each year.
 
1 I thank Alexander Berger for guidance; Phillip Cook, Gerhard Gmel, Jean-Luc Heeb, Pia Mäkelä, Bill Ponicki, and Alex 
Wagenaar for comments on earlier drafts; and Luke Muelhauser for a vigorous peer review. 
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1. Introduction 
Heavy drinking is associated with many health and social problems, including liver disease, unsafe sex, domestic 
violence, homicide, and reckless driving. In 2012, 28,000 Americans died from alcohol-caused diseases. Another 
10,000 lost their lives in alcohol-involved motor vehicle crashes, accounting for 31% of all motor vehicle deaths 
(Murphy et al. 2015, Table 10; NHTSA 2014, pp. 1−2). Worldwide in 2010, the death toll from alcohol-caused 
disease was 155,000 (calculated from WHO database). This is why the Open Philanthropy Project, or Open Phil, is 
exploring opportunities to influence public policy to reduce dangerous drinking. 
Many policies affect drinking and related behaviors: criminal penalties for drunk driving, the minimum drinking 
age, state monopoly of retail, advertising rules, regulations on when bars can be open and who they can serve, 
outright prohibition, and more. In the US, alcohol taxes have hardly risen in a generation—indeed, have been 
drastically eroded by inflation (see figure below). In 1990, President Bush signed a deficit reduction bill that 
included an alcohol tax hike (visible below); thereby, Bush broke his “no new taxes” pledge, weakened his 
reelection bid, and helped make tax increases anathema in American politics. Conceivably, increasing taxation is 
now the low-hanging fruit in alcohol control policy. 
 
But if taxes are low-hanging fruit, how nutritious are they? How certain should we be that taxing alcohol reduces 
consumption in general and problem drinking in particular? How much illness, physical or social, would be 
averted? 
Many studies examine the impacts of changes in alcohol taxes or prices. Nelson (2013, Table 1) finds 578. The 
literature is so big that it contains a sub-literature of systematic reviews (e.g., Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro 2009; 
Wagenaar, Tobler, and Komro 2010; Nelson 2013a, 2014a, 2014b). 
Few of the underlying studies attain high-quality causal identification as that term is meant today in economics, 
exploiting randomized treatment or strong natural experiments. Here, I focus on the minority of studies that do 
use natural experiments—sudden changes in alcohol taxation in certain states or countries. 
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Superficially, the high-quality studies contradict each other. Alcohol tax cuts apparently did not increase problem 
drinking in Denmark or Hong Kong, for instance, but did in Finland and Switzerland. 
Yet the overall pattern across the quasi-experiment studies is that the larger the experiment—the larger the price 
change—the clearer the effects. The 7% tax hike in Alaska on October 1, 2002, and the 18% cut in Finland on 
March 1, 2004, are leading examples.2 The simplest and most plausible explanation for the “null” results in other 
contexts is that their natural experiments were too small to produce unambiguous consequences. 
Overall, in my view, the preponderance of the evidence says that higher prices do correlate with less drinking and 
lower incidence of problems such as cirrhosis deaths. And, as I elaborate, I see little reason to doubt the obvious 
explanation: higher prices cause less drinking. A rough rule of thumb is that each 1% increase in alcohol price 
reduces drinking by 0.5% (Nelson 2013a, as discussed below). And, extrapolating from some of the most powerful 
studies, I estimate an even larger impact on the death rate from alcohol-caused diseases: 1−3% within months. By 
extension, a 10% price increase would cut the death rate 9−25%. For the US in 2010 (author’s calculations, based 
on WHO), this represents 2,000−6,000 averted deaths/year. 
How much a tax-induced price increase would affect violence and traffic deaths is harder to establish from the 
available studies. The clearest impacts in the literature have indeed been on the death rate from cirrhosis, in part 
because drinking is the primary cause, in part because heavy drinkers are presumably most sensitive to price, in 
part because the impact can be nearly immediate, making for easier statistical detection. (Although cirrhosis is a 
chronic disease, it is progressive, so that a sudden increase in drinking can speed death among those in whom the 
disease is most advanced. Seeley 1960.) Impacts on crime, suicides, and risky sexual behavior have been reported, 
but have not yet been demonstrated through strong natural-experiment−based studies. 
And even the link to alcohol-caused diseases is less clear in the long term. It is difficult to pin down long-term 
impacts because tax changes mix with many other influences over time. This matters particularly for alcohol, 
because unlike with smoking, many studies find moderate drinking to be healthy. If the death increase from 
discouraging moderate drinking only surfaces after decades, it will be missed in all the studies reviewed. 
However, my preliminary take on the epidemiological evidence is that the health benefits of moderate drinking 
are not certain—not as convincing, for instance, as the natural experiment−based tax impact studies featured in 
this review. Mendelian-randomized studies, which exploit genetic variation to construct natural experiments, have 
found no benefit (Holmes et al. 2014). Mendelian-randomized studies are not as reliable as conventional 
randomized trials (Thomas and Conti 2004). But they may supply the best evidence available since no randomized 
studies have been done on the question. So I think that on current evidence, Occam’s Razor favors the simple 
theory that the harm of drinking rises steadily with quantity at all levels. (Notably, this implies that moderate 
intake of alcohol, like moderate intake of many things, does at most modest harm, so the point is not to warn 
people off drinking at all.) The bottom line for the present inquiry is that, on net, alcohol tax increases are likely to 
save lives in the long run too. 
An important, if en passant, lesson from this review is that taxes are just one way to influence drinking. The lesson 
arises in the discussion below of the early-1980s Alaska and Florida tax hikes, whose effects are inscrutably 
intermingled with those of other, nearly simultaneous policy changes. Nothing in this review suggests that the 
most effective or politically realistic approach to alcohol control is to rely purely on taxes. The best approach may 
be the historical one, which is to pursue many policy reforms at once, however much that may befuddle future 
empiricists. Nevertheless, since many non-tax policies, such as the drinking age, have already been pushed to their 
limits, and since alcohol taxes are historically low, raising them may be a promising practical avenue to improving 
human welfare. 
 
2 Figures calculated below. 
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This document summarizes some recent systematic reviews of this alcohol price impact literature. It then examines 
the natural experiments in depth. 
2. Process 
Papers were included in this review through a two-stage process: search and filtration. 
The search stage was informal and substantially ad hoc. In systematic reviews, discussed more just below, one 
typically searches databases of published papers—and perhaps the web as well, to catch “grey literature”—using 
carefully chosen and documented keywords. Here, in contrast, I found papers by chasing references (including 
ones in systematic reviews), conversing with authors of papers, and performing some web searches.  
The filtration stage was more formal and exacting. Studies were retained only if they were designed to deliver 
credible identification of causal effects, in the sense of Angrist and Pischke (2010). They write: 
Design-based studies typically feature either real or natural experiments and are distinguished by 
their prima facie credibility and by the attention investigators devote to making the case for a 
causal interpretation of the findings their designs generate. 
Since to my knowledge there have been no randomized experiments with alcohol taxes, all of the studies reviewed 
here attempt to exploit natural experiments, in which the tax level in a country or state suddenly changes and 
immediate consequences are tracked. Time series studies, reviewed first, look just at one jurisdiction at a time. 
Panel studies look at many at once—in our case, many US states at once, each of which enacted tax changes at 
different times. 
Alexander Berger of GiveWell provided the starting point for the search: Ayyagari et al. (2009); Cook and Durance 
(2013); Elder et al. (2010); Nelson (2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b); Saffer, Dave, and Grossman (2012); Wagenaar, 
Salois, and Komro (2008); Wagenaar, Tobler, and Komro (2010); Xuan et al. (2013). Of these, all but three—
Ayyagari et al. (2009), Cook and Durance (2013), Saffer, Dave, and Grossman (2012)—are systematic reviews. 
Those by Nelson or by Wagenaar and colleagues are explored below as representative. However, since my goal 
was to focus on primary studies, I did not attempt to cover all relevant systematic reviews. Among the three 
primary papers, Ayyagari et al. (2009) and Saffer, Dave, and Grossman (2012) were set aside because they study 
not taxes but alcohol prices, which vary for many reasons other than the clean experiment of a sudden tax change. 
Cook and Durance (2013) focuses on the federal alcohol tax increase of 1991 and is reviewed below. 
3. Systematic reviews 
As their name suggests, systematic reviews survey and synthesize a set of studies all focusing on the same 
question, such as the effect of drinking on suicide. Sometimes systematic reviews perform their own statistical 
analysis, called meta-analysis: their input is not raw data about alcohol prices or suicide rates, but the 
characteristics and conclusions of the individual studies. They can check, for example, whether studies from a 
particular time period find larger impacts. 
A common challenge in systematic reviews is expressing the results of underlying studies in a form that facilitates 
comparison. If one study finds that raising the beer tax by a nickel per bottle cuts drunk driving fatalities by 10 per 
year and another finds that every 10% rise in wine prices cuts deaths from liver disease by 1%, how are these two 
estimates to be compared or averaged? It requires re-expressing the results in more universal, abstract units. 
The systematic reviews I read use two units. First, when linking prices to sales, they follow common practice in 
economics in speaking of elasticities, which are ratios between proportional changes in variables. An elasticity of 
−0.5 means that a 10% price rise (not tax rise) leads to a 5% sales drop. Second, many reviews use the correlation 
coefficient, which ranges between −1 and +1, with 0 indicating no correlation, +1 indicating perfect, positive 
correlation, and −1 indicating perfect negative correlation. A disadvantage of the correlation coefficient is 
precisely its abstractness: it tells you the sign and precision of a relationship, but not its real-world magnitude. It 
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might be that for every $10 increase in the alcohol tax, drinking falls by exactly 1 glass/year/person, for a perfect 
correlation of −1, yet little real-world impact. But this disadvantage is not easily rectified, for it flows from the 
need to compare diversely denominated findings. 
One important question in meta-analysis is how much weight to give each reviewed study (Borenstein et al. 2009, 
part 3). It can make sense to give a study with a sample of 1,000 people 10 times the weight as one with 100 
people, since it seemingly contains 10 times as much information. And since a bigger sample normally manifests 
as a more precise estimate—narrower confidence intervals or lower variance in the estimates—it is common to 
generalize this thinking by weighting impact estimates in proportion to their precision (or inverse proportion to 
their variance). This is called the “fixed-effects” method of meta-analysis. It assumes that there is one, fixed value 
for the quantity of interest, such as the elasticity of wine purchases with respect to wine prices. Since all relevant 
studies are seen as estimating this one number, those with the most precision get corresponding weight. 
A somewhat opposing approach is “random effects.” It recognizes that the impact of, say, wine taxes, varies by 
place, time, demographic, and product. As a result, random-effects meta-analysis puts more weight than fixed 
effects does on small or otherwise imprecise studies, because they can illuminate the relationships of interest 
under less-studied conditions. 
3.1. Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro (2009), “Effects of beverage alcohol price and tax levels on 
drinking: A meta-analysis of 1003 estimates from 112 studies,” Addiction 
Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro find 112 English-language studies of the impact of alcohol prices or taxes on 
drinking. Most contain several relevant statistical runs (regressions), so Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro gather a total 
of 1,003 distinct impact estimates. 
Taking simple averages across studies, they find price elasticities of −0.46 for beer consumption, −0.69 for wine, 
and −0.80 for distilled spirits (Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro 2009, abstract). The −0.80 means, for instance, that a 
1% price increase causes a 0.8% consumption decrease. Those estimates that do not break out by beverage type, 
being of total alcohol consumption, find an effect on the small end of this range, at −0.51 (their Table 1). This 
makes sense because a rise just in the price of spirits, say, could cause people to switch to beer or wine, making 
for a larger drop in liquor sales than overall alcohol sales; but an across-the-board alcohol price hike forces pushes 
people to cut back drinking per se, which meets more resistance. 
Switching from elasticities to correlations for formal meta-analysis, and using random-effects weighting, 
Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro obtain average correlations between price and quantity sold of −0.17, −0.30, and 
−0.29 for beer, wine, and spirits. Though less intuitive, these more rigorously obtained numbers are all statistically 
significant and ratify the interpretation of the simple-average elasticities just mentioned as real-world negative 
associations.  
Focusing on incidence of heavy drinking, which is the main public health concern, Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro 
(2009, Table 5) find an average overall elasticity of −0.28. Compared to the −0.51 elasticity for total alcohol 
consumption mentioned above, this suggests that the incidence of heavy drinking responds less to price increases 
than does drinking overall. If true, then studies of overall, population-level price elasticities may overestimate the 
benefits of alcohol tax increases, which arise from their impacts on problematic heavy drinking. However, most 
measurements of heavy drinking are based on self-reports on surveys, which are somewhat suspect. We will see 
that a more objective, if indirect, indicator of heavy drinking (Seeley 1960), deaths from alcohol-caused diseases, 
responds quickly and much more elastically. 
3.2. Wagenaar, Tobler, and Komro (2010), “Effects of alcohol tax and price policies on 
morbidity and mortality: A systematic review,” American Journal of Public Health 
This study broadly resembles the previous one, but it assesses effects on health rather than drinking. One casualty 
of the switch is the relatively intuitive elasticity framework, which makes sense for beer sales, but not traffic deaths. 
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(One way to see this is to note that as the beer price goes to infinity, beer purchases must fall toward zero. Not so 
for traffic deaths, since they have causes other than drinking.) Now all results are expressed only as correlations. 
This table, based on the authors’ Table 2, shows how they grouped studies by type of outcome, as well as the 
number of studies in each group, the average correlation, and the 95% confidence interval thereof: 
Outcome 
Number of impact 
estimates1 
Average correlation 
with taxes or prices 
95% confidence 
interval 
Alcohol-related morbidity & mortality 13 −0.347 [−0.457, −0.228] 
Other morbidity and mortality 2 −0.076 [−0.152, +0.001] 
Violence 10 −0.022 [−0.034, −0.010] 
Suicide 11 −0.048 [−0.102, +0.007] 
Traffic 34 −0.112 [−0.139, −0.085] 
STDs and risky sexual behavior 12 −0.055 [−0.078, −0.033] 
Use of other drugs 2 −0.022 [−0.043, 0.000] 
Crime/misbehavior 5 −0.014 [−0.023, −0.005] 
Overall 89 −0.071 [−0.082, −0.060] 
1Some studies count more than once because they estimate impacts on multiple outcomes. 
For every outcome, the average impact is negative and the 95% confidence range either excludes 0 or only barely 
includes it. Again, there is a strong suggestion that raising alcohol prices reduces social ills. 
I reviewed the abstracts of nearly all the underlying studies. My main discoveries were that: 
• A minority of the underlying studies identify causation compellingly, as by exploiting a sharp natural 
experiment. The most promising examples are some of Finland, one of Alaska, and some US panel studies, 
meaning ones taking data across both states and time. I include these in my own review below. 
• Most of the underlying studies draw data from U.S. states over a number of years. Since many social ills 
tend to be correlated, whether across states or over time, it is not clear that the studies are statistically 
independent observations of the impacts of alcohol price changes—that is, not as statistically 
independent as they are treated here in constructing the confidence intervals.  
Despite these reasons for skepticism, the negative association between alcohol taxation and alcohol-related 
problems looks strong. The obvious and reasonable conclusion is that taxes are the cause and better health is the 
consequence. The key question is whether any competing theories should stay us from that conclusion. 
And I struggle to come up with a strong alternative. Reverse causation is probably small: governments might raise 
alcohol taxes to compensate for declining alcohol tax revenue as people drink less; but usually total government 
revenue, to which alcohol taxes are a small contributor, is what matters for such decision-making. Also 
conceivable but probably secondary would be a legislative impulse to raise alcohol taxes because alcohol-related 
health problems are lessening and alcohol taxes are thus seen to be working well.  
As for third variables that could be influencing both taxes and health, creating misleading correlations between 
them, the strongest candidate is income per capita. For example, poorer US states have worse health, at least as 
proxied by life expectancy. Perhaps, being politically conservative, they also have lower taxes, creating the 
negative correlation between drinking and alcohol taxes found in so many studies. But scatter plots of a cross-
section of states bear out only the first of these hypothesized patterns. Across states, wealth and health do go 
together. But the relationship between income and alcohol taxes is, if anything, positive—though that is mostly 
because of the outliers Alaska and Washington: 
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Since both of the graphed relationships are (arguably) positive, it seems hard to construct an alternative theory for 
the negative association between alcohol taxes and health. 
3.3. Nelson (2013), “Meta-analysis of alcohol price and income elasticities—with corrections 
for publication bias,” Health Economics Review 
Jon Nelson, an emeritus economics professor at Penn State, recently published several systematic reviews of the 
effects of alcohol taxation. His research takes a more skeptical view of the claim that alcohol taxes affect behavior, 
especially among heavy drinkers. Although his work is funded by the International Center for Alcohol Policies, 
whose sponsors include Anheuser-Busch, Heineken, and other major alcohol producers 
(icap.org/AboutICAP/Sponsors), his critical perspective is useful. 
Nelson (2013) returns to the territory of Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro (2009), reviewing the impact of taxes on 
sales. But Nelson departs from that review in several respects. Partly because he comes later, he unearths a lot 
more studies. He nets 578 at first, then reduces to 297 after applying several filters, such as requiring analysis of 
the impact of price changes, as distinct from just tax changes. (The elasticity with respect the tax rate is not very 
meaningful, since a 100% increase might only mean a doubling from one penny to two. What is conceptually 
coherent is the elasticity with respect to a change in after-tax price.) Nelson also applies some interesting 
techniques to detect and correct publication bias, which is the tendency of the publication process to select for 
certain kinds of results. Classic publication bias is the under-reporting of results that do not differ significantly 
from zero. It can arise from authors not writing up such unexciting results, or journal reviewers panning them, or 
editors passing over them. But publication bias can exhibit other patterns. In the alcohol impacts literature, for 
instance, researchers and journals may select for the expected negative correlations at the expense of unorthodox 
positive ones. 
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Nelson starts his treatment of publication bias with an informal graphical method called the funnel plot. The 
insight upon which it is based is that if there is one true average effect, and no publication bias, then the results 
should be distributed symmetrically around that average, more tightly so for studies with bigger samples. A 
scatter plot of all the studies’ impact estimates versus sample size or some other measure of precision should be 
funnel-shaped—narrow at the precise-study end and wide at the imprecise end. Here are Nelson’s funnel plots for 
the elasticities of beer, wine, and spirits consumption with respect to price. Each dot represents an estimate from a 
study. The vertical lines show the average estimate across all studies, when weighting by precision as in the fixed-
effects meta-analysis approach explained earlier: 
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Nelson (2013) funnel plots 
 
 
A formal statistical test confirms that all three funnel plots are skewed to the left: imprecise estimates, which are 
more scattered and feed more variation into the publication selection process, appear to be filtered toward 
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reporting negative impacts of price increases. In other words, toward the bottom of each graph, most of the dots 
are on the left. This suggests that the literature on average overestimates the responsiveness of alcohol sales to 
price. To reduce this bias, Nelson drops the 50% of studies with the least precise estimates, the ones most 
susceptible to biased filtering (Nelson 2013a, Table 4).3 The result, using random-effects weighting, is generally 
smaller estimates of alcohol price elasticities: 
Meta-analytic estimates of price elasticities 
 Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro (2009) Nelson (2013) 
Beer −0.46 −0.29 
Wine −0.69 −0.46 
Spirits −0.80 −0.54 
Total alcohol −0.51 −0.49 
  
I find Nelson’s adjustments for publication bias persuasive, and so prefer his estimates as summaries of the 
literature. Note that despite his critical bent, Nelson agrees that higher prices lead to lower sales. 
3.4. Nelson (2014a), “Estimating the price elasticity of beer: Meta-analysis of data with 
heterogeneity, dependence, and publication bias,” Journal of Health Economics 
Here, Nelson elaborates his analysis of the price elasticity of beer, “the drink of choice among youths” (Saffer and 
Grossman 1987a, pp. 353−54). He applies to the same collection of studies a broader set of methods for 
correcting publication bias. The various approaches yield estimates between −0.17 and the −0.30, the highest 
being essentially the same as the −0.29 in the table above. Nelson settles on −0.20 as a representative value (p. 
186). 
One source of variety among Nelson’s methods is that in this study he performs fixed-effect as well and random-
effect meta-analysis. The agnosticism of random effects—acknowledging that the impact of price changes varies 
by context—is intuitive and appealing. But what might be a compelling choice is complicated by publication bias. 
In one respect, random-effects is more vulnerable to publication bias: it puts more stock in the imprecise studies 
at the bottoms of those funnels, where the bias can thrive. On the other hand, researchers and journals can filter 
results based not only on whether the estimates are in a desired range but whether the apparent precision of 
those estimates is high. Given the choice between two estimates, researchers might report the one with the 
smaller standard errors, for example. This can push studies toward the tops of the funnels, where the fixed-effect 
approach especially will give them undue influence, since it weights only by reported precision. 
Nelson (2014a) does not favor one approach over the other, and I am not able to either. In the event, the random-
effects estimates of the responsiveness of sales to price are larger than the fixed-effect ones. 
As a final step, Nelson performs meta-regressions. These take as inputs the output of the individual studies’ 
regressions. The meta-regressions check, for example, whether being published in a journal, or using annual, 
country-level data, is associated with a lower or higher impact estimate. Altogether 17 traits are considered 
(Nelson 2014a, Table 4). One example of the results: elasticity estimates not appearing in journals are 0.1 larger in 
magnitude (more negative) on average (Nelson 2014a, Table 4, row 3). Nelson finds that studies with the 
characteristics he favors (including journal publication and use of annual data) put the elasticity of beer sales 
 
3 My colleague Luke Muehlauser points out that the 50% filtering is done on a sample that already excludes the 10% most 
extreme estimates, meaning the 2.5% highest point estimates, the 2.5 lowest, and the same for the standard errors. This double 
filtration does not minimally arbitrary, and so raises the question of whether the findings are sensitive to eliminating the first 
filtration. 
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volume with respect to price at −0.17 (fixed effects) or −0.20 (random effects) (Table 4, row 1, columns 1 and 6). 
From these, it appears, he draws −0.20 as representative (p. 186). 
Nelson’s choices in performing meta-regressions look reasonable. But compared with the funnel plot analysis, the 
meta-regressions are more discretionary, creating their own opportunities for bias. A defender of a greater beer 
price elasticity might have chosen a different list of study traits, and expressed different preferences as to their 
best values. For example, it is not obvious to me that analyzing annual data produces more reliable results than 
analyzing quarterly or monthly data since high time resolution can reveal immediate impacts of sudden, tax-
induced price increases, strengthening causal ascription. According to Nelson’s (2014a, Table 4, row 4) using high-
frequency data boost the magnitude of the elasticity by 0.2.  
3.5. Nelson (2014b), “Binge drinking, alcohol prices, and alcohol taxes: A systematic review 
of results for youth, young adults, and adults from economic studies, natural 
experiments, and field studies,” working paper 
This review focuses on the price-responsiveness of heavy drinking. Unlike the other papers described so far, this 
one is a systematic review, but not a meta-analysis. It does not average numerical results across studies. Instead, it 
groups studies by type and counts how many in each group find significant impacts on heavy drinking. 
From the abstract: 
Results: More than half of economic studies report insignificant results for prices or taxes (30 null 
of 56 studies), with mixed results in 13 studies and significant results in only 13 studies. Null 
results are equally distributed across age groups, but some mixed results reflect different 
outcomes by gender. Prices or taxes are insignificant for 11 of 16 samples for men and 7 of 14 
samples for women. Four of five natural experiments report null results for country-level tax cuts. 
Six field studies examine a variety of pricing methods and drink specials, but results are mixed. 
Conclusions: A large body of evidence now indicates that binge drinkers are not highly-
responsive to increased prices or taxes, and may not respond at all. 
The counts of studies finding null results—lack of impact—are interesting but not rigorous. To understand why, 
imagine I have an unfair coin in my pocket. I commission 1000 studies of its fairness. In 999, the researchers flip 
the coin only once. They do their analysis properly, and so find no statistically significant evidence of unfairness. 
The last researcher flips the coin a million times and discovers its true nature. Working in Nelson’s mold, we would 
conclude that the vast majority of studies find no evidence of unfairness. A proper meta-analysis, on the other 
hand, would reach the right conclusion by giving nearly all its interpretive weight to the one good study. The 
example is fanciful, but the lesson is practical: counting null results will lead one astray unless one also takes into 
account the power of each study to detect any impact. In our case, that depends on the size of the tax or price 
change in each case. 
To appraise this review more directly, I followed up on the national-level natural experiments that Nelson refers to, 
which are the studies most likely to produce persuasive results. The natural experiments were sudden changes in 
the price or accessibility of alcohol in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and Hong Kong. As discussed 
below, I corroborated Nelson’s interpretations of these studies in all cases save Switzerland. Thus, three rather 
than four of the five natural experiments produce null results. And the three with null results—Hong Kong, 
Denmark, and Sweden—are the three where prices changed least (indeed, not at all in Sweden). So, as will be 
seen, a dose-response story best explains the evidence: the bigger the tax or price change, the clearer the impact. 
In addition, any complete assessment of impacts on heavy drinking needs to embrace studies of outcomes to 
which heavy drinking has been tightly linked by medical science, such as cirrhosis deaths (Seeley 1960). If cirrhosis 
deaths plunge right after a tax rises, that should shift our beliefs about whether taxes affect heavy drinking. 
Nelson does not take that on, but this review does.  
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4. Times series studies 
Having surveyed some recent surveys, we will now dive into some individual studies, ones that in my view had the 
most potential to produce credible evidence of causality, not just correlation. The studies are of three main kinds: 
time series studies, which as one would expect follow developments over time; cross-section studies, which 
compare countries or states at a given time, and panel studies with work across time and space at once. 
The time series studies examined here are at their core “interrupted time series” (or “before-after”) analyses. 
Within some jurisdiction, tax rates on alcohol change overnight. Researchers compare levels or time trends in 
drinking patterns and health outcomes before and after. The logic is intuitive. And the studies can be strong, 
especially when focusing on short-term impacts. If cirrhosis deaths plunge right after alcohol taxes spike, that can 
be compelling evidence. So I reviewed all the interrupted time series studies of sudden tax changes that I found. 
But interrupted time series studies can also mislead. To be most compelling, they should: 
• Be geared to detect short-term impacts. If a statistician finds that after taxes rose in April, deaths fell in 
May, that is far more persuasive than if she finds that deaths fell in 2010 after taxes rose in 2000. As 
Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002, p.173) write in their seminal text on impact evaluation, “With delayed 
effects, the longer the time period between the treatment and the first visible signs of a possible impact, 
the larger the number of plausible alternative interpretations.” 
• Strive to rule out competing explanations for any discontinuity found, such as simultaneous changes in 
non-tax policies. 
• Perform a falsification test: demonstrate the absence of a discontinuity where we would not expect one, 
such as six months before or after an actual tax change. 
The first three time series studies reviewed here track developments in individual states: Florida, Alaska, and 
Illinois. To set the stage, these graphs show how alcohol taxes evolved in those states, after adjusting for inflation, 
and expressing relative to gallons of pure alcohol content. The last graph is a composite of the first three, 
weighting by consumption of each alcohol category.4 We again see the downdraft from inflation. Counteracting 
that trend are two increases each in the three states, signified by upward jumps. All but the first Illinois tax 
increase enters the studies below. The second Alaska increase emerges as easily the largest. Indeed, according to 
my calculations the tax increase on spirits was the largest of any state since 1971, after adjusting for inflation. 
 
4 Assumptions about pure ethanol are based the benchmark products used in the ACCRA price data: 4.5% for Bud/Miller Lite, 
12% for Gallo Chablis, 43% for J&B scotch (Ponicki 2004, ACCRAdjust.xls). Weights are apparent consumption in gallons of 
pure ethanol terms, from LaVallee, Kim, and Yi (2014). typical weights are 50% beer, 20% wine, 30% spirits. 
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Inflation-adjusted alcohol taxes in Florida, Alaska, Illinois (2014 $/gallon of pure alcohol) 
  
   
Alcohol taxes are transmitted to consumers, and thereby affect their behavior and health, through prices. Exactly 
how much and over what timeframe are unclear. Alcohol comes in many forms at many price points, so the 
relative price increase from a given per-gallon tax increase generally depends on the product. And retailers 
exercise discretion in how much and how quickly they raise sticker prices. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
maintains an alcohol prices index as part of its measurement of overall inflation, but does not break the index out 
by state. In a detailed study, Kenkel (2005, Table 1) found that shops and restaurants in Alaska typically passed on 
the 2002 tax increase twice over.  This suggests that consumers did not aggressively compare prices before 
buying, limiting competitive pressures on sellers. Or perhaps retailers had resisted inflationary pressures for years, 
not fully passing on cost increases to their customers, until the tax increase broke the dam.5 Looking across many 
states and the years 1982−97, Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) concur on the prevalance of 50−100% over-
shifting, and find that it takes at most three months after a tax increase. 
I have obtained state-level price data for products representing the three alcohol categories (Ponicki 2004, 
ACCRAdjust.xls): a six-pack of Bud Lite or Miller Lite, a 1.5 liter bottle of Gallo Chablis, and a 0.75 liter bottle of J&B 
scotch—much the same data as in Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002). The data are available longest for the 
stand-in for spirits, 1976−2003 for most states, and are graphed here for the three states of interest. The first 
Alaska tax hike and the second Illinois one are outside the sample. The second Alaska one shows up strongly while 
the two Florida ones are striking for their near-invisibility. The federal tax increase of 1991 also shows up, with a 
modesty that happens to belie its true size because it applied less to spirits than to beer and wine, as is clear from 
 
5 Reviewer Bill Ponicki suggested this hypothesis. 
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the graph in the introduction to this review. It is important to keep these relative magnitudes in mind. If any of the 
state tax increases were big enough to send detectable ripples into the statistics on human health, that one 
should. On the flipside, lack of credible evidence of impact for the smaller increases could just as easily reflect lack 
of statistical power as it does lack of impact. 
 
 
4.1. Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar (2010), “Effects of alcohol taxes on alcohol-related 
mortality in Florida: Time-series analyses from 1969 to 2004,” Alcoholism: Clinical and 
Experimental Research 
Florida raised taxes on beer, wine, and liquor on July 1, 1977, and September 1, 1983 (DISCUS 1985, p. 45). 
Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar (2010) looks for and finds effects on the rate of death from alcohol-related 
diseases in the state. 
The “treatment” variable—Florida’s inflation-adjusted tax rate—was graphed earlier. The next figure, which I 
computed using the primary data source (NCHS 1969−2004; population data from SEER 2014), shows Maldonado-
Molina and Wagenaar’s outcome variable6: 
 
6 This graph adopts the definition of "alcohol-related mortality" in Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar (2010), Table 2; it filters 
by requiring that state of occurrence (not residence) is Florida and age of deceased ≥ 15. It corrects an apparent small error in 
the original study's 1969–78 figures by including ICD-8 code 303.9. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Alaska
Florida
Illinois
Price of J&B scotch (2014 $/gallon pure ethanol)
Source: Ponicki (2004)
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Death rate from alcohol-linked diseases, Florida, 1969−2004 
 
Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar model the fluctuations in the outcome using the complex but common 
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) method. Then, in effect, they check whether the death rate 
fell in a way not predicted by that model in the months after each tax hike. 
ARIMA models attempt to account for the distinctive traits of time series data. Previous values of the variable can 
affect future ones, making a variable "autoregressive," as when a rise in GDP leads to more investment, leading to 
more GDP. That is the “AR” in “ARIMA.” Meanwhile, sometimes a series is best seen not as a sequence of random 
numbers but as a running sum of such numbers. Here, the classic example is the random walk of a drunk, whose 
position at each moment is the cumulative sum of all random steps taken to that point. Technically, this trait 
makes a series "integrated," giving us the “I” in “ARIMA.” It tends to manifest as long-term but not necessarily 
straight-line trends; the series in the graph above, for instance, may be integrated because the death rate seems 
stable or rising in the early 1970s, declines for a stretch in the late 1970s and 1980s, and then flattens out. In 
addition, influences on the outcome that are themselves of secondary interest to the researcher can come and go 
on shorter time scales, creating a "moving average" process, signified by the “MA.” Finally, there can be seasonal 
fluctuations: for whatever reason, more people die in winter. By explicitly representing all these dynamics, ARIMA 
and seasonal ARIMA (SARIMA) models can help a researcher isolate changes not predicted by those dynamics, 
such as a sudden drop in the death rate. 
One disadvantage of ARIMA models is that they have a lot of moving parts, which can be configured in a lot of 
ways: a model can be integrated or not, seasonal or not; transient moving average effects can last two periods or 
more; etc. And since real data are noisy and limited, often it is not obvious which ARIMA variant fits best. In an 
experiment run in the early 1980s with simulated data sets, 12 extensively trained graduate students were able to 
identify the correct ARIMA model only 28% of the time (Velicer and Harrop 1983). 
Yet perhaps the slipperiness of the ARIMA fit is not a major concern for us. Unlike economists interested in how 
past inflation affects future inflation, we are only interested in understanding the time-series dynamics in order to 
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remove them from the data; they are noise whose erasure, we hope, will more fully expose the signal of a tax's 
impact. If that impact is substantial enough, it should not matter much if the noise is imperfectly modelled and 
incompletely removed. (On the other hand, if the correctness of the ARIMA model is secondary, perhaps simpler 
methods such as a pure autoregressive model would serve.) 
Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar add controls to their ARIMA model to reduce the influence of statistical third 
factors that might have affected alcohol mortality around the time of the tax hikes: the alcohol-related mortality in 
the rest of the country, the non−alcohol-related mortality rate within Florida, and Florida’s average personal 
income.7 So for example, if abstemiousness rose nationwide around when Florida raised its taxes, then this would 
be picked up and removed by the variable representing the alcohol mortality rate in the rest of the country.8 
And, crucially, their model also allows for sudden changes in death rates in July 1977 and September 1983, the 
two months that began with tax increases.9 They conclude that those increases saved lives. If Florida brought 
inflation-adjusted tax rates back to the level reached after the 1983 increase, it would save 600−800 lives a year 
(Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar 2010, p. 1920). 
In assessing the credibility of these results, two questions seem paramount to me: Might other Florida-level 
factors have explained any reductions in alcohol-related deaths after the tax hikes? And would the results survive 
a falsification test? Neither is addressed in the paper.10 
As for the first question, Florida, like nearly all states, tightened alcohol policies in the early 1980s. It made drunk 
driving per se a crime (even when no harm is done) as of January 1982. In mid-1985 it raised the minimum 
drinking age to 21 (NHTSA 2008, p. 19). So other forces were at work on drinking in Florida around the time of the 
second tax hike. 
As for the question of falsification, I carried out the check myself after approximately replicating the Maldonado-
Molina and Wagenaar regressions. The table below compares the authors’ preferred regressions with my 
replications. Each coefficient measures the estimated impact of alcohol taxes, proxied by the beer tax, on deaths, 
with the death variable defined in three ways, as listed on the left edge of the table. For example, the value of 
−0.771 in the middle row implies that a $1 increase in the beer tax (in inflation-adjusted dollars of 2009) saved 
 
7 I had trouble determining precisely which ARIMA models the Florida and Alaska studies use. The Florida study states “First, 
we examined a seasonal ARIMA model with structure (0,1,1)(0,1,1)12; and the final model is (1 − 𝐵12)𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜔𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑍𝑡 +
𝝍𝐗𝑡 + (1 − Θ𝐵
12)𝑢𝑡," where 𝐵
12 is the 12-month lag operator, 𝑌𝑡 is a death rate variable, 𝐼𝑡 is the tax rate, 𝑍𝑡 is the alcohol-
related death rate in the rest of the US, and 𝐗𝑡 is the other controls. Going by this equation, the "final model" is purely 
seasonal; it would be denoted by (0,0,1)12 and would be applied to the seasonally differenced 𝑌𝑡. This seems a strange model: 
the seminal Box and Tiao (1975, eqs. 5.2, 5.4) study treats outcome variable and intervention dummy in parallel rather than 
seasonally differencing one but not the other. Moreover. Table 3 in the Florida study restores the (0,1,1)(0,1,1)12 label in its title, 
and  confirms that specification by reporting coefficients for moving average terms of orders 1 as well as 12. I also match Table 
3's results better using that model, so this is what I use in text. My confusion carries over to the Alaska study, which presents a 
nearly identical structural equation (eq 1) and does not otherwise state the ARIMA parameters. In the face of uncertainty, and 
for consistency and conventionality, I use (0,1,1)(0,1,1)4 in the Alaska study replication below. The match is reasonable, as will 
be shown. 
8 …at least to the extent that the Florida and national death rates are linearly related. 
9 Their preferred model (their Table 3) actually does not include dummies for the two tax increase dates, but a single variable, 
the inflation-adjusted (beer) tax rate. So technically, the preferred regressions are not an interrupted time series design. 
However, the authors report alternative regressions using ITS-style dummies; and about 75% of the variation in the tax rate 
variable can be explained by those dummies, so the distinction does not appear important. 
10 The first question constitutes the item 1 in the Cochrane quality checklist for interrupted time series designs (Cochrane EPOC 
2002). The second is rarely raised in connection with time series, but is often mentioned in connection with regression 
discontinuity design (Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux 2010, p. 326), which is highly analogous with ITS (Shadish, 
Cook, and Campbell 2002, pp. 229–30). 
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0.771 lives/month per 100,000 Floridians aged 15 or older. The match between the original and the replication is 
not perfect, but is close enough to corroborate. 
Associations between inflation-adjusted beer tax rate and alcohol-related deaths, Florida, 1969−2004 
Outcome 
Original (Maldonado-
Molina and Wagenaar 
2010) Replication 
Replication, 
correcting 1969−78 
death counts 
Deaths/month −69.280 −70.781 −62.358 
 (25.369)*** (21.557)*** (16.152)*** 
Deaths/100,000/month −0.771 −0.750 −0.823 
 (0.373)** (0.285)*** (0.233)*** 
Log deaths/population/month −0.271 −0.219 −0.268 
(elasticity model) (0.115)* (0.106)** (0.099)*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Independent variable is state beer tax in 2009 dollars. All 
regressions control for Florida non-alcohol-related deaths, non-Florida U.S. alcohol-related deaths, and Florida personal 
income/capita in 2009 dollars. In replication, monthly values for population and personal income are interpolated. All 
replication regressions are ARIMA (0,1,1)(0,1,1)12. 
Source: Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar (2010), Table 3; author's calculations. 
However, it appears that for 1969−78, the years in which underlying causes of death were coded with ICD edition 
8 (wolfbane.com/icd/icd8h.htm), the Florida and Alaska studies (the latter discussed next) inadvertently omit 
deaths with code 303.9, "Alcoholism: Other and unspecified."11 Correcting this apparent error does not affect the 
Florida results much (last column of the table above). 
Having matched well, I dropped the beer tax variable in favor of something more appropriate for interrupted 
times series studies, a "dummy" that represents the interruption, being 0 before and 1 after. By design, if this jump 
date coincides with a tax increase and the coefficient on the dummy is strong, that suggests an impact on 
mortality.  To perform the falsification test, I repeatedly ran the regression corresponding to the bottom-right 
corner of the table above while varying the allowed jump date across all months between January 1970 and 
December 2004. This graph shows the coefficients on the dummy along with 95% confidence intervals: 
 
11 I exactly match the Alaska death counts (Wagenaar, Maldonado-Molina, and Wagenaar 2009, fig. 2), only if I exclude the 52 
deaths so coded in 1976–78. 
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Falsification test for Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar (2010) model of log alcohol-related deaths/100,000, 
1970−2004 
 
It bears emphasizing that this graph depicts not a mortality trend, but month-to-month percent changes in 
mortality rates not otherwise predicted by the statistical model. So, the high values in 1972 suggest that in those 
months, alcohol-related mortality rose more (or fell less) for several months in a row to a degree not otherwise 
predicted by the model. In the same sense, the death rate was low in the tax increase months, July 1977 and 
September 1983; the grey 95% confidence intervals there include zero, but only barely, so it is reasonable to view 
these numbers as non-zero. However, in both cases, the negative deviation from expected mortality rates appears 
before the tax increase—especially so for the 1983 one. Now, for technical reasons, this test can produce evidence 
of a decline one month earlier than it actually occurs.12 But in the graph, the low values begin to appear at least 3 
months early.  
It seems most plausible to me that the drunk driving law entering into force in January 1982 had more to do with 
the early-1980s dip than the September 1983 tax increase did. The late-1970s dip, or at least its strong 
continuation after July 1977, can be ascribed more readily to a tax increase, but not with the certainty that a more 
superficial interpretation of the study might suggest. 
4.2. Wagenaar, Maldonado-Molina, and Wagenaar (2009), “Effects of alcohol tax increases 
on alcohol-related disease mortality in Alaska: Time-series analyses,” American Journal 
of Public Health 
The Alaska study resembles the Florida one in subject, authors, method, and conclusion. It too finds that two tax 
hikes in recent decades cut deaths from alcohol-related diseases. And it too does not perform any time-shifting 
falsification tests, nor examine whether contemporaneous non-tax events could have explained the mortality 
drops. 
 
12 The study's model includes a first-order moving average term, and the unit of time is the month. 
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The study differs from the Florida one in some technical respects. The data series start in 1976 rather than 1969. 
Instead of regressing on the actual inflation-adjusted tax level, the study regresses on dummies for each tax 
increase date—August 1983 and October 2002—which holds truer to the spirit of interrupted time series analysis 
by focusing exclusively on the interruptions. The authors also drop two controls, state personal income/capita, and 
the state non-alcohol-related death rate, retaining only the alcohol-related death rate in the rest of the country. 
(In my tests, the excluded variables do lack statistical significance.) In addition, probably because Alaska's 
population is much smaller than Florida's, the study tallies deaths by quarter rather than month. Otherwise, noise 
in the data would especially dominate the signal because of Alaska's small population. In the first three months of 
1976, for instance, Florida had 308, 295, and 264 alcohol-related deaths while Alaska had 7, 6, and 0, according to 
my calculations. The drop from 6 to 0 is a huge plunge, relatively speaking, but probably is mostly noise. It 
signifies much less than would a plunge from 264 to 0. Aggregating to the quarter removes some noise.13 
The 2002 tax increase was especially large: from $0.35 to $1.07/gallon for beer, $0.85 to $2.50 for wine, and $5.60 
to $12.80 for spirits (Ponicki 2004, BEERRATE.xls, WINERATE.xls, and SPIRRATE.xls). Relative to representative 2002 
retail prices ($5.37 for a 6-pack of 12-ounce bottles of Bud or Miller lite, $7.40 for a 1.5 liter bottle or Gallo Chablis 
or equivalent, $25.71 for 0.75 liter bottle of J&B scotch or equivalent), the taxes represent price increases of 7.5%, 
8.8%, and 5.5% respectively (Ponicki 2004, ACCRAdj.xls). Weighting by 2002 consumption in pure ethanol terms 
(LaVallee, Kim, and Yi 2014), the average tax increase was about 7%.14 
As with the Florida study, despite some uncertainties about technicalities (see footnote 7), I match the Alaska 
results reasonably well. Compare the first two columns in this table: 
Associations between tax increases and alcohol-related deaths, Alaska, 1976−2004 
Outcome Original Replication 
Replication, correcting 
1976−78 death counts 
Deaths/quarter    
August 1983 tax increase −5.65 −2.70 −1.01 
 (1.73)*** (2.33) (2.95) 
October 2002 tax increase −5.15 −7.70 −6.57 
 (2.11)** (2.24)*** (2.14)*** 
Deaths/100,000/quarter    
August 1983 tax increase −1.37 −1.28 0.61 
 (0.50)*** (0.57)** (0.76) 
October 2002 tax increase −1.23 −1.78 −1.76 
 (0.57)** (0.62)*** (0.59)*** 
Deaths/100,000/quarter, controlling for alcohol-linked death rate in rest of US 
August 1983 tax increase −1.19 −1.24 −0.64 
 (0.52)** (0.56)** (0.72) 
October 2002 tax increase −1.36 −1.70 −1.49 
 (0.57)** (0.68)** (0.66)*** 
Log deaths/100,000/quarter, controlling for alcohol-linked death rate in rest of US 
August 1983 tax increase −0.19 −0.21 −0.12 
 (0.08)** (0.09)** (0.09) 
October 2002 tax increase −0.19 −0.23 −0.24 
 (0.09)** (0.12)* (0.11)** 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Independent variables are dummies for periods after 
the two tax increases. All regressions control for non-Alaska U.S. alcohol-related deaths. In replication, quarterly 
 
13 Technically, as the numbers fall, Poisson-type modeling becomes more necessary, but this is hard to combine with the 
ARIMA framework. 
14 The weights are 675360, 211560, and 537588 gallons ethanol. 
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values for population are interpolated. All replication regressions are ARIMA (0,1,1)(0,1,1)4. 
Source: Wagenaar, Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar (2009), Table 1, panel 1; author's calculations. 
 
As with the Florida study, I correct the apparent coding in the last column. This time the change greatly weakens 
the suggestion that one tax cut—that in August 1983—saved lives. However, the second, larger increase, in 2002, 
survives the fix. 
As in Florida, the falsification graph (below, using data for 1969−2004) strongly suggests that any early-1980s 
decline in alcohol-related deaths started before the tax increase of that time. In contrast, negative trend deviations 
appear strongly only one quarter before the second tax hike. As mentioned, even if the true trend deviation 
occurred in the quarter of the tax hike, the statistical model can produce a large negative coefficient when the tax 
hike dummy is set for one period early, because the model assumes that large deviations persist across two time 
periods (according to an MA(1) process). Thus the falsification results for 2002 are consistent with the true trend 
break coinciding with the tax hike. 
Falsification test for Wagenaar, Maldonado-Molina, and Wagenaar (2009) model of log alcohol-related 
deaths/100,000, 1970−2004 
 
Like Florida, Alaska changed many policies in the early 1980s in order to discourage excessive drinking, as part of 
a nationwide movement spearheaded by groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving. These concomitant 
developments further muddy any statistical link between the August 1983 tax increase and mortality. Just as in 
Florida, Alaska's per se law went into force in January 1982 (NHTSA 2008, p. 19). Nine months later, refusing a 
blood alcohol test became punishable by loss of driver’s license (NHTSA 2008, p. 19). Though aimed at traffic 
deaths, which are not included in the Wagenaar et al. analysis, the new rules may have discouraged heavy drinking 
generally. Also in October 1982, the minimum drinking age rose from 19 to 21. And on January 1, 1984, additional 
restrictions came into force, including on bars serving alcohol to intoxicated people. This government notice in the 
Tundra Times (State of Alaska 1983) portrays the sweep of the legal changes: 
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Because of the fragility to correcting the death coding, the dissonance in the falsification test, and the competing 
explanators, I cannot confidently attribute any of the early-1980s drop in alcohol-related deaths to the tax hike. 
The story in 2002 seems different, however. The statistical correlation is robust and the drop appears more sharply 
timed to the tax increase. And I have found no evidence of other relevant policy changes at that time. (See 
Hopkins 2013 for a journalist’s account of the passage of the tax.)  
Notably, as graphs at the top of the Florida discussion show, the second Alaska tax increase was the largest of the 
four so far discussed. Perhaps a dose-response story is at work: the larger the tax increase, the more clearly it 
shows up in the mortality data. Because this is a plausible synthesis of the evidence on the four tax increases in 
these two state studies—indeed, it is the simplest—I give disproportionate weight to the suggestive Alaska 2002 
impact finding, of a 20−25% reduction in alcohol-related mortality (bottom row of table above).  
4.3. Staras et al. (2014), “Heterogeneous population effects of an alcohol excise tax increase 
on sexually transmitted infections morbidity,” Addiction 
This paper carries forward the tradition of the Florida and Alaska studies. It looks for a link between Illinois's 
alcohol tax increase in September 2010, and the number of gonorrhea and chlamydia cases in the following 
months. 
These graphs, inspired by ones in the paper, show incidence by race for the two diseases. Clearly, incidence is 
much higher among non-Hispanic blacks: 
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STD cases per 100,000 population per month, by race, Illinois 
Chlamydia 
 
Gonorrhea 
 
At first glance, the graphs might suggest that the tax increase had a strong impact on non-Hispanic blacks, for 
there are clear plunges after the tax increase. However, as the authors document, an unrelated event may explain 
most or all of the dramatic drops in gonorrhea and chlamydia in early 2010. In February 2010, the Illinois 
government, which collects STD reports and annually submits them to the federal Centers for Disease Control, 
0
50
100
150
200
250
Ja
n
-0
3
M
a
y
-0
3
S
e
p
-0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
M
a
y
-0
4
S
e
p
-0
4
Ja
n
-0
5
M
a
y
-0
5
S
e
p
-0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
M
a
y
-0
6
S
e
p
-0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
M
a
y
-0
7
S
e
p
-0
7
Ja
n
-0
8
M
a
y
-0
8
S
e
p
-0
8
Ja
n
-0
9
M
a
y
-0
9
S
e
p
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
M
a
y
-1
0
S
e
p
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
M
a
y
-1
1
S
e
p
-1
1
Black, Non-Hispanic
Hispanic
White, Non-Hispanic
Tax increase
August 2009
Paper-to-electronic
reporting switch
January 2010
New cases/100,000
Source: CDC
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ja
n
-0
3
M
a
y
-0
3
S
e
p
-0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
M
a
y
-0
4
S
e
p
-0
4
Ja
n
-0
5
M
a
y
-0
5
S
e
p
-0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
M
a
y
-0
6
S
e
p
-0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
M
a
y
-0
7
S
e
p
-0
7
Ja
n
-0
8
M
a
y
-0
8
S
e
p
-0
8
Ja
n
-0
9
M
a
y
-0
9
S
e
p
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
M
a
y
-1
0
S
e
p
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
M
a
y
-1
1
S
e
p
-1
1
Black, Non-Hispanic
Hispanic
White, Non-Hispanic
Tax increase
August 2009
Paper-to-electronic
reporting switch
January 2010
New cases/100,000
Source: CDC
Roodman, The impacts of alcohol taxes: A replication review 
22 
 
switched from a paper to an electronic collection system. And the extremely low points for blacks a few months 
after the tax increase are both from February 2010. Staras et al. explain: "Technical problems and the additional 
time required for local health departments to report [STD] cases potentially caused underreporting as health 
departments adjusted to the electronic reporting system." My correspondence (Jan. 28, 2015) with the health 
official that they cite, Danucha Brikshavana of the Illinois Department of Public Health, confirms that the 
adjustment difficulties may have affected the January 2010 data points as well, since some January cases would 
have been entered into the system in February. Case reports for late 2009 were also taken well into 2010, but 
could be submitted on paper, so they may have been affected less, though whether they were completely immune 
to the problem is uncertain. 
The dots between the vertical lines in the two graphs, which are for the fall of 2009 may be on the low side, but 
they do not lie outside the historical range of variation. Perhaps they too are slightly affected by the reporting 
problems. 
The upshot is that 4−5 months after the tax increase, the STD data series appear to have been disrupted by a 
larger force. This makes it hard to attribute the obvious statistical declines among non-Hispanic blacks to the tax. 
The data problem is worsened by the paper’s statistical approach. Instead of checking, as in the Florida and Alaska 
studies, whether month-to-month changes in outcomes were unusual right at the time of the tax increase, the 
regressions check whether incidence levels were lower on average in all the months afterward.15 This allows the 
evident plunge from the paper-to-electronic switch in early 2010 to influence the apparent impact of the tax hike 
in mid-2009. Staras et al. report running ARIMA models as well, which may have addresses this concern (if they 
were integrated of order 1 as the Florida and Alaska models appear to be); however, Staras et al. (2014, pp. 3, 5) 
provides no details of the ARIMA models or results. 
Staras et al. do address the statistical disruption of the paper-to-electronic switch in one way, by experimentally 
dropping data from Cook County, which includes Chicago; is home to a large share of cases; and is where under-
reporting may have been particularly severe (citing state health official Brikshavana). Now the paper finds no clear 
impact on chlamydia, while the apparent impact on gonorrhea incidence falls from 3.2 to 1.9/100,000 
people/month (95% confidence interval 1.3 to 2.5), which is about 1,750/year (Staras et al. 2014, p. 4).16 But 
interpreting this number as a tax impact requires believing that while under-reporting was substantial in Cook 
Country it was minor beyond, a belief for which I do not see evidence. 
I attempted to replicate Staras et al.’s (2014, Table 1) basic regressions—one each for gonorrhea and chlamydia, 
not breaking out by age or race. This table shows their results, my attempted replication, two variants, and a 
parallel regression for Alaska. The first variant cuts off the data after December 2009 because the disruption in the 
data generating process at the start of 2010 argues against using the same statistical model before and after that 
date.17 The second variant stays within this sample while switching to the ARIMA approach of the Alaska and 
Florida papers.18 Last is a regression that transfers the Staras et al. analysis to Alaska, whose tax increase in 2002, 
as we saw, was much bigger than Illinois’s in 2009.19 
 
15 More technically, the regression model (p. 3) is static rather than dynamic in the way that an integrated ARIMA model is. 
16 The population of Illinois outside Cook County is about 12.5 million.  
17 The paucity of post–tax increase observations is undesirable but not necessarily catastrophic. The statistical question is 
whether those observations, however few, violate the pre-increase pattern, which is established from a larger sample.  
18 This monthly regression covers 2002–2012. In 2002, the CDC (2015) STD data set includes all states except Arizona. Before 
that, it is missing 10 or more states. This substantially impedes construction of a Staras et al. (2014, p. 2) control, the STD 
incidence rate in the 12 control states, which is highly significant. 
19 The same could not be done for Florida, because its last tax increase was in 1983, well before the STD data start. 
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Associations between tax hike and new STD cases/100,000 population, Illinois, 2003−11 
Disease 
Original (Staras et 
al. 2014) Replication 
Replication, 
omitting post-2009 
data 
ARIMA, 
omitting post-
2009 data 
ARIMA, Alaska, 
2002−12 
Gonorrhea −3.2 −1.8 −0.3 −2.1 +2.3 
 [−4.2, −2.4] [−3.3, −0.3] [−1.2, +0.6] [−5.2, +1.1] [−2.1, +6.7] 
Chlamydia −4.8 −2.1 −2.0 −4.0 −0.1 
 [−7.8, −1.9] [−3.9, −0.3] [−3.9, −0.2] [−9.9, +1.9] [−10.4, +10.3] 
Observations 108 108 84 84 132 
95% confidence intervals in brackets. First two replication regressions use Newey-West standard errors with a lag limit of 12 
months to allow for seasonality. Independent variables are a dummy for the periods after the September 2009 tax increases 
(October 2002 in Alaska regression). All regressions control for real median household income, and average incidence in 12 
states that allow private retail in alcohol, do not border Illinois, and did not increase alcohol taxes in the study period. 
ARIMA models are (0,1,1)(0,1,1)12. 
Source: Staras et al. (2014), Table 1; author's calculations. 
The replication (column 2) is consistent with the original in the sense of pointing to statistically significant 
reductions in STD incidence. However the implied impacts are about half as big, which is a much larger 
discrepancy than in the earlier replications. Possibly underlying data have been revised, or there is some subtle 
design choice I have missed, or there is an error on one side or the other. At any rate, dropping the suspect post-
2009 data weakens the apparent impact on gonorrhea, but not that on chlamydia (column 3). 
More importantly, switching to an ARIMA model to zero in on whether the incidence trend changed immediately 
post-tax-hike produces much less precise estimates, whose confidence intervals embrace both positive and 
negative values (column 4). The widening makes sense since any measurement of the incidence right after the tax 
increase contains more noise than the average of measured incidence over a sequence of months beginning then. 
So the immediate drop needs to be larger in order to emerge as statistically significant in an ARIMA model fit. 
Confidence intervals are also wide when transplanting the analysis to Alaska, despite the larger sample and bigger 
tax increase (column 5). 
Because of the data problems and the apparent fragility of the results, I have low confidence that the tax hikes 
reduced STDs in Illinois or Alaska. 
4.4. Chung et al. (2013), “The impact of cutting alcohol duties on drinking patterns in Hong 
Kong,” Alcohol and Alcoholism 
In 2008, the government of Hong Kong eliminated its 80% duty on wine and 40% duty on beer, as part of a 
successful effort to build the city into a regional wine-trading hub. The 100% duty on liquor remained. (Chung et 
al. 2013, p. 720.) Since the duties were calculated relative to import prices, retail prices fell much less, 
proportionally: 1.8% for beer and 14.3% for wine (Chung et al. 2013, p. 721). The authors surveyed Hong Kong 
residents before (2006) and after (2011−12) in order to assess the impact on drinking behavior. Surveyors asked 
such questions as whether respondents had had at least 5 drinks at a time in the last 30 days, the chosen 
definition of binge drinking. Analysis consisted of looking for changes between surveys. 
The study has significant limitations. First, the price drop was small, being significant only for wine, which 
accounted for only 15% of Hong Kong alcohol consumption on a pure alcohol basis (Hong Kong DOH 2011, Table 
3). Second, the global recession is itself a major potential confounder; a lot else happened in Hong Kong around 
2008. This matters especially because the surveys did not take place in a tight window around the tax change—
which would strengthen attribution of results to that event—but with a gap between surveys of 5−6 years. 
Changes in drinking over such a long and eventful period cannot be confidently attributed to a modest tax 
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increase somewhere in the middle. By the same token, absence of clear change might merely reflect lack of 
statistical power rather than lack of impact. 
Third, unlike the cause-of-death and crime data used in the studies discussed above, which come from 
governments and pertain to rather objectively observable events, drinking behavior is here self-reported—or not, 
if people refuse to talk to the surveyors. Heavy drinkers may systematically respond less or understate their 
troubles with alcohol.  
Chung et al. find that the share of people who say they had ever had alcohol rose from 66.6% in 2006 to 82.0% in 
2011 and 85.2% in 2012 (p. 720). The duty cuts may have contributed to that climb, but so might other societal 
factors. Surprisingly, the rate of binge drinking (≥5 drinks in one episode in the last month) dropped, from 9.0% to 
7.3%. The authors conclude that cultural and biological factors limited heavy drinking. (As for biology, East Asians 
have less aldehyde dehydrogenase in their bodies, so alcohol accumulates more rapidly in the blood in its toxic 
form, and people get drunk faster.) 
In light of the potential biases from self-reporting, I extracted data from the World Health Organization’s Mortality 
Database on cirrhosis in Hong Kong. I reduced the influence of demographic trends, which could be steadily 
shifting the share of the population at prime risk for liver disease, by extracting the death rate for each age-sex 
group in each year, then estimating the number of deaths that would have occurred if the number of people in 
each of those groups had not changed since 2001. (Alcohol liver disease deaths are defined as those with an 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD)-10 code beginning with K70.20) These statistics corroborate the very 
low level of drinking-related disease—a mere 50 deaths/year—and the lack of any rise after 2008. (A graph for a 
broader family of alcohol-related diseases tells the same story.) 
Deaths from alcoholic liver disease, Hong Kong, 2001 age distribution 
 
Certainly there is little evidence here that the tax cut in Hong Kong increased drinking or its side effects. But with 
the price effect so small and the before-after study period so long, any other result would have been surprising. 
The conservative conclusion is that the null result indicates lack of statistical power rather than the impotence of 
taxation as a policy. 
 
20 http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2015/en#/K70-K77.  
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4.5. Heeb et al. (2003), “Changes in alcohol consumption following a reduction in the price of 
spirits: A natural experiment in Switzerland,” Addiction 
Kuo et al. (2003), “Does price matter? The effect of decreased price on spirits 
consumption in Switzerland,” Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research 
Mohler-Kuo et al. (2004), “Decreased taxation, spirits consumption and alcohol-related 
problems in Switzerland,” Journal of Studies on Alcohol 
Gmel et al. (2007), “Estimating regression to the mean and true effects of an 
intervention in a four-wave panel study,” Addiction 
In July 1999, Switzerland cut import duties on foreign-made spirits in order to comply with World Trade 
Organization rules. This lowered domestic spirits prices 30−50% (Heeb et al., p. 1434). These four studies, all by 
essentially the same team, track the impacts. 
To provide background, I tried to graph alcoholic liver disease deaths for Switzerland as I did for Hong Kong 
above. However, Switzerland’s data uses a condensed coding system that does not break out such fine-grained 
categories as alcoholic liver disease, but only the broader categories of all liver disease. Since alcohol is blamed for 
the majority of liver disease deaths in neighboring countries (In France, about 67% for men and 59% for women in 
2000; and in Germany 61% and 47%) the broader totals are still a relevant, if imperfect, indicator: 
Deaths from liver disease, Switzerland, 2001 age distribution 
 
Surprisingly, the death rates drop in 2000, the first full year after the import duty was cut for spirits. This challenges 
the hypothesis that the duty cut increased drinking. But not definitively: Death from liver disease is not 
synonymous with death from alcoholic liver disease. More drinking is not synonymous with more alcohol-related 
liver disease deaths. Other factors may have reduced mortality, masking the contrary impulse from the price 
decline. Indeed, it is hard to fathom why a duty cut would have caused a mortality decline, which reminds us of 
our ignorance of all the forces at work. But it is not impossible: perhaps the duty cut shifted market prices in favor 
of liquors with lower alcohol content, enough to offset an overall increase in drinking. At any rate, the graphs put 
a perplexing cloud over the findings that follow. 
Using before- and after-surveys, Heeb et al. (2003, p. 1433) report that in a six-month period bracketing the duty 
cut, spirits consumption rose 28.6% in Switzerland while wine and beer consumption remained unchanged. This 
combination of results looks very much like a fingerprint of the duty cut, since it too was specific to spirits. 
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Kuo et al. followed up with a survey two years later. They find the spirits consumption increase to have been 
sustained, at 38% cumulative. They break out the results by age, sex, and other traits. All subgroups except people 
over 60 reported increases: 
Changes in spirits consumption by subgroup, Switzerland, before and after July 1999 duty 
elimination 
 Consumption/day (grams pure alcohol) 
Group Spring 1999 Fall 2001 Change 
All 0.711 0.980 +38% 
Men 0.936 1.217 +30% 
Women 0.521 0.788 +51% 
Age <30 0.934 1.551 +66% 
Age 30−59 0.619 0.870 +41% 
Age ≥60 0.691 0.639 −8%* 
Working 0.806 1.023 +27% 
Not working 0.698 0.898 +29% 
High school degree only 0.932 1.024 +10% 
Post-high school education 0.695 0.959 +38% 
Smoker 0.961 1.314 +37% 
Non-smoker 0.587 0.827 +41% 
Averages ≥3 drinks/day 1.337 1.563 +17% 
Averages <3 drinks/day 0.452 0.737 +63% 
*Only change not differing from zero at p = 0.01. 
Source: Kuo et al. (2003, Table 1, right pane). 
 
The statistics above are straightforward, but do not address how traits interact. It might be, for example, that the 
slightly greater rise among non-smokers owes entirely to non-smokers belonging disproportionately to the 
under-30 age group, which itself increased consumption more. Perhaps after controlling for age, the differential 
by smoking status evaporates.21 
To check such possibilities, Kuo et al. (2003) run multivariate regressions. However, their methods are complex and 
cursorily described; and the column labels in the results table (their Table 2) confuse me: separate columns are 
labeled “Test of the effect p-value” and “p-value.” This may help explain why Nelson’s (2014b) systematic review 
on binge drinking appears to misinterpret the study. (Nelson 2014b, p. 47: “Any changes were not significant 
controlling for age, sex, and volume.”) And, as is unfortunately the norm, data and code have not been posted. For 
myself, e-mail discussion with the lead author has not eliminated the confusion.22 The interpretation that seems to 
fit best is that their Table 2 corroborates the bivariate results quoted above, showing increases in drinking among 
most subgroups, including self-reported heavy drinkers. Most of the reported p values are highly significant. It 
appears that those reporting in the “before” survey that they had ≥3 drinks/day increased alcohol consumption 
 
21 Whether Swiss non-smokers are young, I do not know. This example is purely for illustration. 
22 My guess is that the insignificant p value cited by Nelson (0.3778, in Kuo et al. Table 2) is for the hypothesis that whether a 
person responded to the follow-up survey was uncorrelated with his or her sprits consumption before the abolition of the 
duty—and that in the reference demographic, which is people aged 60 or more. The failure to reject that hypothesis only 
reduces the concern that attrition from the follow-up survey had a pattern that would bias the results. It does not support 
Nelson’s interpretation. 
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0.58 grams/day after the tax cut. That was twice the national-average increase of 0.27 (from 0.711 to 0.980, in first 
row in table above).  
Mohler-Kuo et al. (2004) is a companion to Kuo et al. (2003); in similar fashion, it analyzes answers to different 
survey questions. These ask not about the amount of drinking, but signs of problem drinking, such as “How often 
during the last 6 months have you been unable to remember what happened the night before because you had 
been drinking?” (p. 268). The authors fashion an index of problem drinking from the answers to such questions. 
The index rises on average after the tax cut, especially among young people. Put technically, a follow-up dummy 
(for the second survey round) receives statistically significant, positive coefficient in a regression of the index 
(Mohler-Kuo et al. 2004, Table 2, model 1). But then, when entered, a control for reported consumption of spirits 
outcompetes the dummy for explanatory power (models 2 & 5). The same does not happen when with beer or 
wine consumption, which did not have duties removed (models 3 & 4). This strongly suggests that the passage of 
time increased problem drinking via a rise in spirits consumption only. Again, the distinct pattern for spirits, versus 
beer and wine, helps convince. 
Now, among the subgroup splits in the table above, the last—between heavy drinkers and the rest—is particularly 
susceptible to a kind of statistical bias. The numbers in the table say that those classed as heavy drinkers before 
the duty cut increased their drinking much less than the rest, by 17% instead of 63%. However, this difference may 
be exaggerated by regression to the mean. Most likely some people in the first survey, in spring 1999, happened to 
have drunk more recently than they normally did—whether in reality or imperfect recollection. Some would have 
been inappropriately classed as heavy drinkers, by clearing the 3 drinks/day threshold. Symmetrically, some would 
have drunk less than usual or underestimated their recent drinking, and been misclassified as non−heavy drinkers. 
If the tendency to mismeasure a given person is partly random over time, then we could expect that, like an 
average basketball player who happens to play one great game, the mismeasured drinkers would converge in the 
next survey toward population averages. Thus even if there were no true difference between heavy and light 
drinkers, the follow-up survey would show a smaller increase for the heavy drinkers. Turning that around, if 
regression to the mean could be purged from the data, then the table above could show an even larger relative 
rise among heavy drinkers. 
Gmel et al. (2007) study this issue systematically.  They take advantage of the fact that two survey rounds were 
conducted after the tax cut. Since alcohol taxes did not change between these latter surveys, they can more 
confidently attribute any apparent convergence between heavy and non−heavy drinkers over those later rounds 
to the statistical mirage of regression to the mean. Then, having gauged the effect, they can then approximately 
remove it from results like those in the table above. 
Gmel et al. (2007, p. 32) conclude that after the Swiss tax cut, heavy drinkers actually increased their drinking more 
than others—but only temporarily. By the two-year follow-up, the difference had disappeared. This suggests that 
in the long run, price changes affect heavy drinkers about as much as the general population. 
The story most consistent with the evidence is a bit complicated: after the duty cut, problem drinking and drinking 
in general increased; yet deaths from liver disease, and thus probably from alcoholic liver disease, fell. As already 
conjectured, some of the foreign liquors that became more affordable may have contained less alcohol content 
than their Swiss competitors, causing people to drink more alcoholic beverages but take in less pure alcohol. This 
effect would have escaped detection in the surveys studied above, which asked people only about how many 
drinks they had or how often they drank. If the conjecture is correct, it would confirm the responsiveness of 
drinking behavior to taxation. And it would demonstrate the potential for unintentional side effects from tax 
changes that are not across the board and well calibrated to alcohol content. 
4.6. Koski et al. (2007), “Alcohol tax cuts and increase in alcohol-positive sudden deaths: A 
time-series intervention analysis,” Addiction 
Mäkelä et al. (2007), “Changes in volume of drinking after changes in alcohol taxes and 
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travellers' allowances: Results from a panel study,” Addiction 
Mäkelä and Österberg (2009), “Weakening of one more alcohol control pillar: A review 
of the effects of the alcohol tax cuts in Finland in 2004,” Addiction 
Herttua, Mäkelä, and Marikainen (2008), “Changes in alcohol-related mortality and its 
socioeconomic differences after a large reduction in alcohol prices: A natural experiment 
based on register data,” American Journal of Epidemiology 
Herttua et al. (2008), “The impact of a large reduction in the price of alcohol on area 
differences in interpersonal violence: A natural experiment based on aggregate data,” 
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 
Bloomfield et al. (2010), “Changes in alcohol-related problems after alcohol policy 
changes in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden,” Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs 
Helakorpi, Mäkelä, and Uutela (2010), “Alcohol consumption before and after a 
significant reduction of alcohol prices in 2004 in Finland: Were the effects different 
across population subgroups?”, Alcohol and Alcoholism 
Gustafsson (2010), “Alcohol consumption in southern Sweden after major decreases in 
Danish spirits taxes and increases in Swedish travellers’ quotas,” European Addiction 
Research 
In integrating with the European Union, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden changed several alcohol policies in 2003 
and 2004. In January 2004, the countries raised their limits on how much alcohol travelers could carry when 
entering from other EU member states. Then in May, Estonia joined the EU, making it easier for people to buy 
alcohol in Estonia and bring it into nearby Finland. Anticipating competition for domestic retailers through this 
import channel, Denmark and Finland cut domestic taxes. In March, Finland reduced taxes on spirits (by 44%), 
fortified wine (40%), table wine (10%), and beer (32%). Denmark had cut its spirits tax 45% the previous October. 
For its part, Sweden did not cut alcohol taxes, but at least in the southern part of the country, alcohol became 
more available because of the higher traveler’s allowances and lower retail prices in nearby Denmark. (Bloomfield 
et al. 2007, pp. 182−83.) 
These graphs show how the policy changes translated into prices.23 In Sweden, where no taxes were cut and the 
government held a retail alcohol monopoly, prices did not change. In Finland, where taxes fell the most and the 
government also holds a retail monopoly, the drop was dramatic. As expressed here, the index fell 18%, from 
107.5 in February 2004 to 88.1 in March. An immediate price impact is also visible in Denmark, but it is smaller, 
presumably because only the tax on spirits fell. Perhaps as well, the subsequent downward trend reflects delayed 
market adjustment to the duty cut; in Denmark alcohol sales are the province of the private sector. (Market 
structures from Örnberg and Ólafsdóttir 2008.) 
 
23 Data are from Eurostat via FRED: FRED data series CP0210DKM086NEST, CP0210FIM086NEST, CP0210SEM086NEST. 
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Alcohol consumer price indexes (January 2000 = 100) 
   
A substantial literature has tracked these natural experiments. The findings are reassuringly consistent across 
studies—and arguably coherent with the price graphs above, in the sense that impacts are found only where the 
natural experiment was largest, in Finland. There, several studies show, people in some demographics drank more, 
and died more from alcohol-linked diseases such as cirrhosis. By and large, Denmark and Sweden did not 
experience such changes. That said, despite my hint (after the fact) that the results were about what one should 
expect, the lack of impact in Denmark and Sweden surprised authors of the studies reviewed here. After all, it 
came in spite of the increased ease of import in both countries and the price drop in Denmark. (Mäkelä et al. 
2008, p. 181: “The results did not confirm expectations.” Bloomfield et al. (2010), p. 38: “…surprising findings on 
self-reported alcohol problems and alcohol consumption.”) 
The thrust of the results from the various studies is conveyed in three more graphs, which are analogous to my 
earlier one for Hong Kong. In Finland, the numbers of men and women dying from alcoholic liver disease jumped 
between 2003 and 2004 and kept climbing through 2007, until the alcohol price began to recover. No such 
developments appear clearly in Denmark and Sweden. 
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Deaths from alcoholic liver disease, 2001 age demographics 
  
 
Mäkelä and Österberg (2009, fig. 2, copied below) confirm that in Finland, alcohol sales rose after the tax cut. The 
grey line in their graph shows the percentage increase in 2004 sales relative to the same week in 2003. The black 
line smooths those numbers with a 5-week moving average. Before week 10, when the tax fell, the year-on-year 
change hovered around 0. After, it jumped to 20−40% and then settled into a long-term 10% rise. The other major 
spikes in the graph should be ignored as artifacts of major holidays falling in different weeks in the two years, 
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Alcohol sales by week in Finland, 2004, relative to 2003 
 
Herttua, Mäkelä, and Martikainen (2008) find that Finland’s worse-off suffered the largest increases in deaths from 
alcohol-related diseases—notably the unemployed and those in the lowest three income quintiles. (However, the 
increase was not quite as large in the lowest quintile, perhaps because alcohol was still expensive for this group.) 
To wit, this table excerpts their results: 
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Change in death rate from alcohol-related diseases between 2001−03 and 2004−05, by 
subgroup, Finland   
  Men   Women 
  % 
change 
95% confidence 
interval  
% 
change 95% confidence interval 
People aged 30+           
Age*           
30−39 +13.5 [+0.8, +27.8]   +1.8 [−23.0, +34.5] 
40−49 +6.3 [+0.0, +14.1]   +7.3 [−8.0, +25.1] 
50−59 +23.9 [+17.4, +30.8]   +52.7 [+36.0, +71.5] 
60−69 +15.4 [+7.8, +23.5]   +30.6 [+13.1, +50.8] 
70−79 +6.0 [−4.3, +17.4]   +23.8 [+0.0, +55.1] 
80+ +16.9 [−9.9, +51.7]   −16.1 [−50.0, +40.9] 
Education           
Upper tertiary +7.8 [−11.3, +31.1]   +56.0 [+0.4, +142.3] 
Lower tertiary +16.0 [+4.7, +28.5]   +11.5 [−9.9, +38.0] 
Secondary +20.3 [+13.9, +27.0]   +39.8 [+23.5, +58.3] 
Basic +16.1 [+11.0, +21.5]   +34.2 [+22.0, +47.6] 
Social class           
Upper white-collar +8.4 [−3.7, +22.0]   +31.9 [+2.3, +70.1] 
Lower white-collar +14.2 [+4.4, +24.9]   +34.9 [+19.5, +52.2] 
Skilled worker +17.0 [+10.4, +24.0]   +10.6 [−9.0, +34.5] 
Unskilled worker +18.2 [+11.6, +25.1]   +33.5 [+18.0, +51.1] 
Self-employed +14.9 [+1.8, +29.6]   +17.6 [−12.9, +58.7] 
Other +11.1 [−0.5, +23.9]   +38.4 [+7.4, +78.1] 
All +17.1 [+13.4, +21.0]   +30.6 [+21.7, +40.0] 
            
People aged 30−59           
Economic  activity*           
Employed +2.9 [−4.7, +11.1]   +8.0 [−9.4, +28.7] 
Unemployed > 2 years +21.2 [+11.7, +31.5]   +49.9 [+24.8, +79.9] 
Unemployed ≤2 years +30.1 [+14.2, +48.1]   +81.3 [+39.8, +135.1] 
Pensioned +27.1 [+18.0, +36.9]   +36.6 [+16.3, +60.5] 
Other +21.5 [+6.3, +38.8]   +54.0 [+18.3, +100.4] 
Income  quintile*           
1 (highest) +17.2 [+5.6, +30.1]   +17.8 [−6.8, +48.9] 
2 +17.5 [+5.3, +31.0]   +61.2 [+28.3, +102.5] 
3 +78.8 [+61.7, +97.7]   +81.5 [+46.2, +125.3] 
4 +64.0 [+50.6, +78.6]   +78.2 [+49.1, +112.9] 
5 (lowest) +19.4 [+10.4, +29.2]   +48.4 [+25.1, +76.1] 
All +19.2 [+14.6, +24.1]   +33.6 [+22.4, +45.8] 
*Hypothesis of same change in all subgroups is rejected at p = 0.1 for age, economic activity, and income 
quintile, for both men and women. 
Source: Herttua, Mäkelä, and Marikainen (2008, tables 1 & 2). 
The various studies of these natural experiments are summarized as follows: 
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• Koski et al. (2007) performs time series analysis like that in the Florida and Alaska studies, using Finnish 
government data on deaths by cause and week for 1990−2004. They find that alcohol-related deaths 
jumped in 2004—by about 8 deaths per week, or 400 per year. This is about twice the increase seen in my 
Finland graph above, partly because mine is restricted to liver disease. (A version of my graph embracing 
all alcohol-related diseases shows a rise from 1243 to 1505 a year for men and from 360 to 423 for 
women.) The study gains strength from de-facto falsification tests. Since the traveler’s allowance increase, 
tax cut, and accession of Estonia took place in January, March, and May of 2004 respectively, the 
regressions allow for trend breaks at all three points. Only the break corresponding to the tax cut is 
statistically significant. In addition, rates of death from causes not linked to alcohol show no changes at 
any of the dates (Koski et al. 2007, table 1). 
• Mäkelä et al. (2007) is based on surveys fielded in Denmark, Finland, and southern Sweden. Self-reported 
drinking did not increase in any of the regions. In all three, it tended to converge across age groups, with 
older people drinking less and younger drinking more. The lack of apparent overall increase in Finland 
contradicts the sales data from the Finnish retail monopoly graphed above, not to mention the jump in 
deaths, suggesting that surveys based on self-reports underestimate drinking changes. 
• Bloomfield et al. (2010): Like Mäkelä et al. (2007), and involving most of the same authors, this study 
analyzes results from surveys fielded in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in 2003−06. Northern Sweden is 
taken as the control region. This study focuses on self-reported signs of problem drinking, as Mohler-Kuo 
et al. (2004) does for Switzerland. If anything, prevalence of alcohol problems decreased in Denmark, 
Finland, and southern Sweden relative to the control region.  
• Helakorpi, Mäkelä, and Uutela (2010) also works from a repeated survey, but one performed only in 
Finland. Perhaps because the sample is larger—79,100 received the survey by mail and 72% responded—
this survey-based analysis, unlike Mäkelä et al. (2007), detects changes quite in line with what Herttua, 
Mäkelä, and Marikainen (2008) find in government data. Moderate and heavy drinking became more 
common, especially among those who were 45−64 years old or less educated. 
• Mäkelä and Österberg (2009) documents alcohol-related trends in Finland including the sales data 
graphed earlier. In addition, they show how annual statistics point to tax-cut-attributable increases in 
deaths from alcohol-related diseases and drunk driving (the latter temporary), but not to a link with 
violent crime: 
Assaults and drunk driving cases per 100,000 population, Finland 
 
• Herttua, Mäkelä, and Marikainen (2008) is represented by the table above. 
• Herttua et al. (2008) looks across 86 administrative tracts in Helsinki, and finds no rise in interpersonal 
violence from 2002−03 (pre-tax-cut) to 2004−05 (post-tax-cut). 
• Gustafsson (2010) surveyed people in Denmark and southern Sweden by telephone during 2003−06 about 
how much they drank, and how often they engaged in heavy drinking. Again, no sudden changes were 
found in these countries despite the policy changes of 2003−04. 
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5. Cross-section studies 
5.1. Cook and Durance (2013), “The virtuous tax: Lifesaving and crime-prevention effects of 
the 1991 federal alcohol-tax increase,” Journal of Health Economics 
In 1990, President Bush and the US Congress agreed to a deficit reduction package that was famously taken to 
violate Bush’s “no new taxes” pledge. Among other things, it raised taxes on alcohol: from $0.29 to $0.58/gallon 
for beer, $0.17 to $1.07/gallon for wine, and $12.50 to $13.50/gallon for spirits (the last expressed in volume of 
pure ethanol content). As a result, consumer alcohol prices rose 10% in January 1991: 
U.S. alcohol consumer price index (March 1983 = 100) 
 
The paper of Cook and Durance works to exploit this natural experiment in a way quite different from the studies 
above. In fact, technically, it is not a time series study, nor really a quasi-experimental one. Instead of testing 
whether drinking or its side effects dropped nationwide right after the tax rose, Cook and Durance compare 
trends across states. They hypothesize that drinking fell more in states where it had farther to fall: people in 
“wetter” states felt the added tax more than those in “drier” states, and cut back more in absolute terms. This in 
turn may have manifested as larger drops (or smaller increases) in violent crime, traffic deaths, and suicides in the 
wetter states. Cook and Durance (Tables 2 & 3) check for this cross-state pattern and find it for suicide, assault, 
and robbery. 
This study too must clear additional hurdles before it can convince. One challenge is that it wants to attribute 
convergence to a tax increase in a context in which convergence was already occurring. Even before the tax 
increase, with the exception of Utah, alcohol sales were falling most where they were highest to start with: 
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Alcohol sales by state, 1980 & 1990 
 
If the Cook and Durance theory holds, long-term convergence in drinking is a force for convergence in crime, 
traffic deaths, and suicides regardless of any tax changes. It therefore does not suffice to demonstrate that states 
converged on these outcomes right after the alcohol tax rose: that would be expected anyway. Cook and Durance 
need to show that convergence temporarily accelerated in 1991. Understanding this, the authors run regressions 
that control for state-specific long-term trends. 
A second hurdle is the standard concern about the exogeneity of “treatment.” The clever Cook and Durance 
strategy requires that a state’s per-capita alcohol consumption just before the tax correlated with subsequent 
trend deviations in crime, traffic deaths, and suicides only through the causal chain they sketch. But low- and high-
consumption states appear to have differed systematically in many respects. The 10 lowest-consumption states in 
1989 (Utah, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Kentucky, Kansas, Arkansas, Alabama, Tennessee, Iowa, Mississippi) were 
relatively southern, rural, and poor. The 10 highest-consumption ones (Colorado, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, 
Hawaii, California, Vermont, Arizona, Florida, Delaware, Wisconsin) were on average more urban and wealthy, and 
perhaps healthier and better educated too. For reasons separate from alcohol taxes, the two groups may have 
exhibited systematic differences in levels and trends in crime, traffic deaths, and suicide. Perhaps, for example, the 
poor, dry states suffered more from the 1990−91 recession, causing their crime rates to climb relative to the wet 
states. This could produce the sort of result Cook and Durance find—improvement in crime in wet states relative 
to dry states—without involving alcohol taxes. 
The third concern is the lack of falsification tests. If the Cook and Durance theory is right, shifting their analysis 
backward or forward a few years should produce null results. 
To better understand the data, in particular to apply that falsification test, I replicated Cook and Durance, starting 
from the same public data sources (LaVallee, Kim, and Yi (2014) for the latest update on alcohol consumption; FBI 
Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics for crime data; CDC for fatal injury reports). One subtlety needs explaining. The 
arrival of the tax on January 1, 1991 appears to have distorted alcohol buying in both 1990 and 1991, making both 
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years’ sales data unreliable proxies for actual drinking. Evidently, people rushed to buy alcohol before the price 
rose, shifting sales from early 1991 to late 1990: 
 
This is why Cook and Durance use 1989 rather 1990 sales data to measure how “wet” a state was. 
For each outcome of interest (homicide, traffic deaths, etc.), Cook and Durance perform three kinds of regressions. 
Their results and my replications are in the table below. The matches are not perfect, but again good enough to 
head off any doubts about implementation errors or fragility to data revision. Read this table less to digest 
individual results than to confirm the consistency between the original results, on the left, and the new ones, on 
the right. 
The first type of Cook and Durance regression, in the first and fourth columns, applies to a cross-section: it checks 
whether, across states, per-capita alcohol sales in 1989 correlated with the subsequent change in each outcome, 
between 1990 and 1991. As the first column shows, all of the correlations are negative, which is consistent with 
the theory that where people drank the most, drinking and its side effects fell more after the January 1991 tax 
increase. And many of those negative correlations are statistically significant. 
However, these regressions do not address the possibility highlighted above that long-term trends driven by 
factors other than the tax increase can fully explain convergence. The regressions reported in the remaining 
columns take on this concern by incorporating annual data for each state for 1985−95, and allowing for fixed state 
and year effects. They ask whether the 1990−91 deviation in each outcome, relative to each state’s 1985−95 
straight-line trend, and after removing nationwide ups and downs, was correlated with 1989 alcohol sales. The 
“Panel II” regressions in the last column are more conservative still in abstracting from long-term convergence in a 
second way, by controlling for the recent alcohol sales level (1 or 2 years back). In other words, to the extent that a 
greater decline in crime, traffic deaths, or suicide could be predicted by a higher drinking level in the previous 
year, this effect too is saved from accidental attribution to the tax hike. In the event, this conservative adjustment 
does not affect results much: “Panel I” and “Panel II” results nearly match. 
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Cross-state correlations between 1989 per-capita alcohol sales and 1990−91 changes in death and crime rates 
 
My results, in the right half of the table, also add rows for outcomes not found in the published Cook and Durance 
study. In particular, the first row checks for whether alcohol consumption indeed fell more in “wetter” states 
during 1989−92 as Cook and Durance hypothesize; it does seem to have, even after controlling for long-term 
convergence (upper-right corner). Because of the sales data distortion, the results here pertain to the changes 
over 1989−92 rather than 1990−91 as in the other regressions. In addition, to guard against data mining, the 
bottom rows of my results restore four outcomes examined in the Cook and Durance (2011) working paper but 
dropped from the 2013 journal publication: property crime, burglary, larceny, and vehicle theft. 
 Original (Cook and Durance 2013)  Replication 
 Cross−section Panel I Panel II  Cross−section Panel I Panel II 
Alcohol sales (liters/person 14 or older, change, 1989−92) 
  −0.203 −0.128 −0.127 
     (0.040)*** (0.041)*** (0.038)*** 
 
Deaths/1000 people (change, 1990−91) 
  
All injury types −4.266 −4.481 −4.501  −4.381 −4.248 −4.341 
 (1.715)** (1.852)** (1.837)**  (1.720)** (1.889)** (1.871)** 
Homicide −2.153 −3.641 −3.657  −2.190 −4.972 −5.271 
 (6.003) (6.429) (6.429)  (6.004) (6.054) (6.016) 
Suicide −6.559 −6.712 −6.703  −6.557 −6.585 −6.584 
 (3.158)** (3.476)* (3.476)*  (3.175)** (3.665)* (3.673)* 
Traffic −5.371 4.368 4.410  −5.369 −4.878 −5.050 
 (2.909)* (3.175) (3.175)  (2.915)* (3.145) (3.157) 
 
Crimes/100,000 people (change, 1990−91) 
All violent crime −8.952 −7.773 −7.773  −8.994 −7.872 −7.883 
 (2.679)*** (2.651)*** (2.654)***  (2.684)*** (2.576)*** (2.601)*** 
Murder −6.054 −4.078 −4.006  −6.034 −4.245 −4.239 
 (6.163) (7.369) (7.402)  (6.172) (6.880) (6.949) 
Rape −4.149 −2.086 −2.118  −4.138 −0.783 −0.902 
 −4.026 (3.948) (3.970)  (4.043) (4.130) (4.161) 
Assault −10.080 9.367 −9.361  −10.133 −10.037 −10.069 
 (3.284)*** (3.458)*** (3.461)***  (3.294)*** (3.513)*** (3.555)*** 
Robbery −11.236 −9.692 −9.690  −11.264 −9.571 −9.496 
 (5.069)** (4.761)** (4.771)**  (5.071)** (4.807)* (4.830)* 
Property     −5.296 −3.547 −3.465 
     (2.016)** (2.052)* (2.067) 
Burglary     −5.815 −3.603 −3.564 
     (3.046)* (2.932) (2.939) 
Larceny     −4.275 −2.257 −2.211 
     (1.983)** (2.069) (2.073) 
Vehicle theft     −13.097 −14.697 −14.395 
     (4.109)*** (4.444)*** (4.471)*** 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. AK, DC, NH, NV excluded. Panel 
regressions cover 1985−95 and include state and year dummies. “Panel II” regressions control for lagged alcohol sales, 
with the lag of 1 year in the original and 2 in the replication to avoid distorted 1990 data. 
Source: Cook and Durance (2013), Tables 2 and 3; author's calculations. 
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If we set aside “All injury” and “All violent crime” as aggregates that include, and thus are not independent of, the 
other rows’ outcomes, then 4 of the 11 distinct death and crime rate outcomes in the table exhibit negative 
deviations from long-term trends in 1990−91 that are statistically significant at p = 0.1 (last column of table). This 
is much more than the 10% that would be expected from pure chance if Cook and Durance’s model were 
completely wrong. 
To apply a falsification test, I reran the regressions in the last column while varying the focus period across the 
1985−95 range of the data set. In addition to checking for a correlation between 1989 sales and 1990−91 trends, I 
checked for a correlation between 1988 sales and 1989−90, trends, etc. Because of the sales data distortions just 
mentioned, I omitted regressions involving 1990 and 1991 sales (and thus 1991−92 and 1992−93 outcome 
changes). I expanded the samples as much as data availability permitted, to 1967−2004 for injury deaths and 
1967−2012 for crime deaths.24 
The figure below displays the results. Red dots show the best-fit estimates and blue lines show 95% confidence 
intervals. The results in the last column of table above correspond to the data points for 1991 in each plot. For 
instance, in the “All injury” graph in the top left we see that any drops in the death rate from injuries in 1990−91, 
over and above what would be expected from broader trends, is significantly, negatively related to a state’s pretax 
“wetness,” as proxied by 1989 alcohol sales. To repeat, this fits the Cook and Durance hypothesis that wetter states 
reduced drinking and its side effects more. 
 
 
24 Wine consumption data are unavailable before 1967. Post-2004 geocoded NCHS mortality data have not yet been obtained. 
For precision and consistency outcome variables were recalculated using population denominators from SEER (2014). 
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Falsification test of Cook & Durance “Panel II” regressions 
 
Perusing the plots, the associations between initial alcohol sales and subsequent trend deviations seems weaker 
for causes of death (first row of graphs) than violent crime (remaining graphs). For almost every crime category, 
1990−1991 (plotted at 1991) is the period with the strongest negative association between how wet a state was 
and how much the crime rate dropped soon after: 1991’s red dot is usually the lowest. In contrast, 1991 does not 
stand out as much in the first row’s plots relating to causes of death. 
So Cook and Durance appear to have found a real statistical pattern consistent with theory in the case of crime—
other than murder—but not injury deaths. The next question is what else might explain this matter. While this 
study centers on a natural experiment—a sudden, national tax rise—the statistical comparisons made (technically, 
the source of identification) are cross-state. And cross-state comparisons are not generally seen as quasi-
experimental, since states differ systematically in many correlated ways. Other forces, such as the 1990−91 
recession might also explain the drops in crime in 1990−91 in wet states relative to dry ones, if the recession 
raised crime more in drier states. Ruling out such competing explanations would require delving more into the 
drivers of temporal and geographic crime patterns, which Cook and Durance do not do. Such a counterargument 
cannot be raised against the time series studies looked at earlier, because they compare purely across stretches of 
time during which taxes suddenly changed, not across geographies differentiated by complexes of correlated 
traits. On balance, the Cook and Durance hypothesis that the alcohol tax hike reduced crime looks plausible, but 
not certain.  
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6. Panel studies 
Except for Cook and Durance (2013), the studies discussed so far track events in a single state or country over 
time. We will next look at papers that combine time series data from many geographies into a single analysis. 
These are called panel studies because they follow a panel of observational units—in our case, US states—over 
time.25 
At their best, panel studies increase statistical power—that is, the ability to detect impacts—by studying many 
natural experiments at once. They can also reduce publication bias to the extent that they prevent researchers 
from focusing, however unconsciously, on the places where correlations happen to manifest as hoped. However, 
some panel studies relating to alcohol policy cannot lay such strong claims to causal identification. A panel study 
relating, say, drinking levels to drunk driving deaths would not qualify as quasi-experimental because both 
variables exhibit variation over time and space that may make them correlated for reasons other than the direct 
causal link of interest. To be more compelling, I think a panel study should: 
• As with times series studies, focus on the impacts of sudden changes in policy. 
• As with times series studies, be geared to detect short-term impacts. 
• As with times series studies, use additional controls or knowledge outside the statistical analysis to rule 
out competing explanations for any correlation found. 
• Control for any effects of variables outside the analysis that are fixed over time, within states; and likewise 
control for effects fixed across states, within each time period. (For more on fixed effects, see Roodman 
(2014).) This is not possible with time series studies; the possibility with panels is one of their strengths. 
• Perform falsification tests. This idea too carries over from time series studies, but the application needs to 
change. Varying “the” assumed date of a tax change makes less sense when dozens occur within the 
sample. But other falsification tests can be run, for example of whether an alcohol tax change affects 
non−alcohol-related mortality. 
These methods are powerful in combination. For example, among US states, inflation-adjusted alcohol tax 
increases were larger and more frequent in the 1960s than the 1990s (calculated from Ponicki 2004 tax rate files), 
and yet the US cirrhosis death rate rose in the 1960s and fell in the 1990s (Yoon, Chen, and Yi 2014, fig. 1). A study 
that only met my first criterion could conclude that raising taxes increases cirrhosis rates. But if time and state 
fixed effects were also controlled for, satisfying the third criterion, then such coincidentally correlated time trends 
would be expunged from the analysis, at least to the extent they were nationwide. 
To survey the panel literature, I reviewed abstracts of studies included in the Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro (2009) 
systematic review. I read in full those that focused on taxes rather than prices, and that included fixed effects. The 
review that follows is not exhaustive but should be representative. 
Apparently the first to study several alcohol tax natural experiments at once was Julian Simon (1966); in so doing, 
he coined the term “quasi-experiment,” which means nearly the same thing as “natural experiment” (the 
ambiguous distinction having to do with whether a tax change is “natural” or whether the before-after framing 
around such an event is an imposed construct of the researcher). But we will start our selective review in 1982. 
The panel literature splits rather cleanly into two strands: one that takes cirrhosis as the outcome and emphasizes 
liquor taxation; and one that takes traffic fatalities, typically among young people, as the outcome and focuses on 
beer. 
6.1. Liquor taxes and cirrhosis 
6.1.1. Cook and Tauchen (1982), “The effect of liquor taxes on heavy drinking,” Bell Journal of Economics 
 
25 The Saffer (1991) data set takes countries rather than states as the unit of observation, but has information on prices only, 
not taxes. 
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Cook and Tauchen (1982) brought panel econometric methods to alcohol taxes. Their sample consists of the 30 
states where governments license private companies to sell hard liquor. (Where state governments monopolize 
retail the concept of “tax” becomes fuzzy since the state sets prices and retains all profits: raising a tax without 
raising prices would reduce profits, for zero net effect.)  Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia also license 
private retail but were excluded, apparently because they are seen as unrepresentative. The time dimension runs 
from 1962 to 1977 with annual observations. Cook and Tauchen analyze these data in a way that meets all my 
criteria. State and year fixed effects are included; the time frame for impact is short, at 1−2 years; and the variation 
driving the natural experiments is discrete, occasional changes in the inflation-adjusted liquor tax rate. 
Converting to dollars of 2014, Cook and Tauchen find that on average, a tax increase of $1/liter of pure alcohol 
was associated with declines of 1.7% in liquor consumption and 1.6% in cirrhosis mortality in the same calendar 
year (Cook and Tauchen 1982, Table 2).26,27 For reference, that tax increase would be $0.32 if imposed on a 0.75 
liter bottle of 86-proof Scotch.28 
Cook and Tauchen follow up with Granger and Sims causality tests, which are fairly rigorous checks on whether tax 
changes are typically followed by changes in liquor consumption and cirrhosis mortality. The Granger test 
regressions differs from the one just cited in also controlling for previous-year values of a given outcome variable. 
The idea is this: With standard regression methods, a computer can derive from the history of, for example, the 
unemployment rate, a formula for predicting each month’s rate based on past months’ rates. The formula may 
work well most of the time but fail when some unanticipated event, such as a financial crisis, occurs. In that case, 
adding to the forecasting formula an indicator of systemic financial duress can significantly improve predictions. If 
it does, then the financial indicator is said to Granger-cause unemployment, for it suggests that financial duress 
today does not merely predict unemployment in the future, but truly affects it. The Sims test is similar in spirit and 
equivalent in theory (Sims 1972), if backwards in structure. It asks whether a predictions of one variable based only 
upon its own past values can be improved by including future values of another, just as knowing that US 
unemployment spiked in January 2009 makes it more likely, in some retrospective sense, that the financial system 
seized up months earlier. 
In the case at hand, the tests confirm that liquor taxes Granger-cause liquor purchases and deaths from cirrhosis, 
but not vice versa (Cook and Tauchen 1982, p. 387).  
One concern about this study is that tax changes might merely be proxying for other alcohol policy changes 
typically occurring at about the same time. However, this seems unlikely because in the United States alcohol 
control policies generally weakened from the end of federal Prohibition until the mid-1970s, when the modern 
movement for stricter alcohol controls gained steam—and that was after this study’s timeframe. So it is hard to 
see how non-tax policies could have mimicked alcohol tax hikes in effect. Between 1969 and 1976, no state for 
which I have data raised the minimum drinking age, while most lowered it, at least for beer and wine (Ponicki 
2004, minage.xls). No state outlawed drunk driving per se until 1983 (“drunk” meaning having a blood-alcohol 
level above 0.08; Ponicki 2004, 08BACLAW.SAV). And the number of people living in counties that were “dry for 
liquor,” i.e., where sale was illegal, fell steadily through this period (Ponicki 2004, wet.sav and BeerDry.sav). 
 
26 The Cook and Tauchen tax variable is in 1967 dollars per proof gallon, which is a gallon of liquor that is 100 proof, meaning 
50% ethanol by volume. Liquor excise taxes are normally calibrated to ethanol content, so lower- and higher-proof liquors are 
proportionally taxed. The Consumer Price Index averaged 33.4 in 1967 and 236.736 in 2014 
(download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/cu.data.1.AllItems). The coefficients on the contemporary tax variable are –6.3% and –6.0 
%/(1967 $/proof gallon) (Cook and Tauchen 1982, Table 2). Multiplying those by 33.4 / 236.736 / 2 proof gallons/gallon 
ethanol × 3.7854 liters/gallon = 0.267 gives the figures in text. 
27 Cirrhosis mortality is age-adjusted to 1970 demographics, much as in my earlier graphs for Hong Kong, Denmark, Finland, 
and Sweden. 
28 86 proof means 43% ethanol. $1 × 0.75 × 43% = $0.3225. 
Roodman, The impacts of alcohol taxes: A replication review 
42 
 
To assess the robustness of these results I approximately replicated them and introduced variations. The major 
apparent discrepancy between my data set in the original is in the construction of the mortality variable. Cook and 
Tauchen use cirrhosis mortality among those at least 30 years old. For mundane reasons having to do with data 
availability and the need to construct data sets to support replications of studies with diverse variable definitions, 
my outcome variable is cirrhosis deaths among those 15 and older divided by an approximation of the population 
at least 30 years old. This discrepancy can be expected to affect the magnitude of the coefficients, less so their 
statistical significance or meaning. 
Once again, the replication is reasonably good (first two columns of table below). The coefficient on the current-
year alcohol tax is similar (−0.055 instead of −0.063 proportional reduction from a $1 tax increase in 1967 dollars) 
and remains statistically strong (first row). The coefficient on the previous-year spirits tax (second row) remains 
close to zero. The sums of these pairs of coefficients (third row) match well too. 
To check robustness I expanded the sample from 1962−77 to 1960−2004 (third column below). This only 
strengthened the results, doubling the sum of the current- and previous-year coefficients. Next, for comparability 
with earlier studies, I expanded the outcome from just death from cirrhosis to include alcohol poisoning and 
terminal damage to brain, heart, stomach, and pancreas (definition from Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar 2010, 
Table 2). This further increases coefficients (fourth column). Finally, as a falsification test, I switched from cirrhosis 
deaths to non−alcohol-related deaths. Here, we expect and find no impact (last column). Finally, I ran Granger 
tests for the expanded-sample regressions. These pointed clearly to causality from the spirits tax rate to cirrhosis 
and alcohol-related mortality more generally (p = 0.01, 0.0000) but hardly at reverse causality (p = 0.20 and 
0.79).29 
 
29 The Granger regressions include state and year dummies, two lags of the tax, mortality, and personal income. Two lags are 
used, just as in Cook and Tauchen (1982), because that is what is favored by Akaike and Bayesian information criteria. Standard 
errors are clustered two-way by year and state. In the death rate Granger regressions, observations are weighted by 
√𝑛𝑝/(1 − 𝑝), where 𝑛 is the population in a state-year and 𝑝 is the crude probability of death (Maddala 1983, p. 29). 
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Associations between spirits tax and death rates, US states 
 Cook & Tauchen 
original 
(cirrhosis, 
1962−77) 
Replication 
(cirrhosis, 
1962−77) 
Expansion to 
1960−2004 
Expansion to 
1960−2004, 
alcohol-caused 
deaths 
Expansion to 
1960−2004, 
non−alcohol-
related deaths 
Spirits tax, 
current year 
(1967 $/gal) 
−0.063 −0.055 −0.080 −0.092 −0.007 
(0.015)*** (0.027)** (0.022)*** (0.029)*** (0.004) 
 [−0.107,−0.003] [−0.123,−0.037] [−0.149,−0.036] [−0.015,0.002] 
Spirits tax, 
previous year 
(1967 $/gal) 
−0.009 −0.007 −0.059 −0.074 0.000 
(0.015) (0.026) (0.021)*** (0.028)*** (0.004) 
 [−0.059,0.044] [−0.100,−0.017] [−0.129,−0.019] [−0.008,0.008] 
Sum, current & 
previous 
−0.072 −0.062 −0.139 −0.167 −0.006 
(0.017)*** (2.28)** (5.35)*** (4.74)*** (1.08) 
 [−0.115,−0.009] [−0.190,−0.088] [−0.236,−0.098] [−0.018,0.005] 
Observations 480 480 1320 1320 1320 
Standard errors in parentheses. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions use 
generalized least squares to correct for AR(1); the replication regressions use the Durbin-Watson correlation estimate. 
Coefficients on current and lagged per-capita personal income and state and year dummies not shown. Taxes are for liquid 
gallons of beverage. Dependent variable in original (first column) is cirrhosis death rate for people age≥30. In replications, it 
is deaths among people age≥15 divided by an approximation of population≥30. In replications, coding of cirrhosis deaths is 
from Yoon, Chen, and Yi (2014, p. 5) and those of alcohol-caused and non-alcohol-related deaths from Maldonado-Molina 
and Wagenaar (2010, table 2). 
Sources: Cook and Tauchen (1982, table 2); author’s calculations, from Ponicki (2004); NCHS; BEA (State personal income 
data); SEER (2014). 
 
The rigorous design, the Granger-Sims tests, the robustness, the coherent results on the falsification test, and the 
difficulty of constructing an alternative explanation for the findings all make this study persuasive. 
6.1.2. Ponicki and Gruenewald (2006), “The Impact of Alcohol Taxation on Liver Cirrhosis Mortality,” Journal of 
Studies on Alcohol 
This study updates and augments Cook and Tauchen (1982), shifting the timeframe from 1962−77 to 1971−98 
and adding beer and wine taxes. Unsurprisingly in light of my own update, Ponicki and Gruenewald largely 
support Cook and Tauchen: a liquor tax increase of $1/liter pure alcohol (in 2014 dollars) is quickly followed by a 
1.2% drop in cirrhosis deaths, which is comparable to the 1.6% estimated by Cook and Tauchen.30 Beer and wine 
taxes, interestingly, do not seem to have much effect (Ponicki and Gruenewald 2006, Table 1, model 3). This 
suggests that alcoholics get more of their alcohol from liquor, making them more sensitive to its price. Possibly 
the effect is confined to those of limited means, since they may be more price-sensitive. 
The main methodological innovation is the use of “random effects” instead of fixed effects. Ponicki and 
Gruenewald start with fixed effects, like Cook and Tauchen, meaning that they enter a dummy variable for each 
state. In the statistical model, this allows each state’s cirrhosis mortality rates to be a fixed percentage above or 
below the national average. For example, New York’s rate could be 10% above the national average in every year 
of the study, all else equal. Pennsylvania’s could be 5% lower. And so on. In initial, unpublished regressions, 
 
30 The Ponicki and Gruenewald tax variable is in 2000 dollars per liter of ethanol. The Consumer Price Index averaged 172.2 in 
2000 and 236.736 in 2014 (download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/cu.data.1.AllItems). The coefficient on the contemporary tax 
variable is –1.7 %/(2000 $/liter ethanol) (Ponicki and Gruenewald 2006, Table 1, model 3). Multiplying that by 172.2 / 236.736 
gives the figure in text. 
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Ponicki and Gruenewald observe that these fixed effects for the 30 states are distributed like a bell (normal) 
curve.31 Then, in the published regressions, they impose the assumption that the state effects are distributed 
normally and estimate only the center and spread (standard deviation) of this distribution. This is the random 
effects model. By estimating two numbers instead of the 30 individual state effects, they conserve statistical 
power.32 Since the data sample—the repository of information—is finite, the more parameters a regression 
estimates, the less power it has per parameter to estimate precisely. So the reduction in moving to random effects 
strengthens the model’s ability to detect tax impacts, at the price of a stronger and therefore more debatable 
assumption about cross-state cirrhosis mortality patterns. Ponicki and Gruenewald counterbalance this shift to a 
stronger assumption by entering controls for a rich set of state traits, including composition by race, age, and 
religion. 
One weakness of the random effects approach is that if the initial fixed-effects regression is so swamped by 
parameters that its results are imprecise—marked by wide confidence intervals—then the inability to reject the 
needed assumption of normal distribution is faint endorsement for the random-effects model. 
But since my regressions for 1960−2004 (above) embrace the Ponicki and Gruenewald timeframe while sticking 
with the more conservative fixed effects model, it seems likely that this concern does not matter much in practice. 
The three sets of regressions—Cook and Tauchen, Ponicki and Gruenewald, and my own—tell a coherent story. 
The short-term statistical link from liquor taxation to cirrhosis mortality looks strong. 
6.2. Beer taxes and traffic deaths 
6.2.1. Saffer and Grossman (1987a), “Beer taxes, the legal drinking age, and youth motor vehicle fatalities,” Journal 
of Legal Studies33 
In 1984, President Reagan signed the Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act, which reduced federal highway funding 
to states that had a minimum drinking age below 21. This reinforced the nationwide trend toward that minimum, 
which had begun in 1976. By 1988 all states had moved to 21: 
 
31 They perform a Hausman test. 
32 Included in the 2 and the 30 is the constant term. 
33 Saffer and Grossman (1987b) elaborate their analysis in one way, instrumenting the drinking age with all the assumed-
exogenous controls in a first-stage ordered-probit equation. There are no excluded instruments. Identification comes rather 
from the nonlinearity of the impact of the exogenous variables on the outcomes via the quantization of the drinking age into 
integer values. The identification assumptions required here are strong, because the nonlinear model for drinking age can pick 
up any other nonlinearities between the exogenous variables and the outcomes (Roodman 2011, p. 180). At any rate, the 
results for the impact of beer taxes are similar. 
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Minimum drinking age by state 
 
This policy evolution attracted academic interest. Saffer and Grossman (1987a) use a state panel for 1975−81 to 
study the impact of rises in the drinking age on motor vehicle fatalities. Along the way, they estimate impacts of 
alcohol taxes too—not those on liquor, as in Cook and Tauchen, but on beer, which is “the drink of choice among 
youths” (Saffer and Grossman 1987a, pp. 353−54). Thus while the study resembles Cook and Tauchen analytically, 
being based on a panel of US states, it differs scientifically, addressing a different health problem, within a 
demographic defined by youth rather than (effectively) by a long history of chemical addiction. 
Saffer and Grossman do run regressions that control for all state fixed effects, as I prefer. However, the brevity of 
the timeframe, just seven years, makes for a low ratio of data points to variables since each state has a fixed-effect 
dummy and just seven observations. This appears to be the cause of some strange results such as that a higher 
drinking age increases deaths for 18-to-20-year-olds. “These results suggest that a model with state dummies is 
overdetermined and plagued by multicollinearity. The implausible nature of the estimates that emerge from this 
specification provides a justification for not emphasizing it” (Saffer and Grossman 1987a, pp. 369−70). Rather like 
Ponicki and Gruenewald, Saffer and Grossman prefer a smaller set of controls for factors that might affect alcohol 
policy and/or traffic deaths: whether states inspect vehicles annually, per-capita income, miles driven per driver, 
the religious composition of the state, and the fraction of people living in “wet” counties, where alcohol could be 
sold. 
Saffer and Grossman run separate regressions for three age groups: 15−17, 18−20, and 21−24. Raising the 
drinking age to 21 registers its largest impacts for the middle group, which makes sense and adds credibility to 
the entire study (Saffer and Grossman 1987a, Table 2, row 1). (Youths in the other groups could still benefit from a 
drinking age rise, since 18−20-year-olds can share alcohol with their younger siblings and friends, and drive cars 
with passengers of other ages.) 
In contrast, a beer tax increase appears to affect mortality about the same within the two older groups. This too 
makes sense since taxes do not discriminate by age. The tax impact does appear lower for the youngest group, 
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which is also plausible since 15-17-year-olds presumably buy alcohol much less.  In particular, according to the 
more conservative of the non-fixed-effects regressions, a $1/six-pack tax increase in today’s dollars cut annual 
traffic deaths by 10% among 15−17-years, 18.5% among 18−20’s and 21−24’s.34 Fixed-effects regressions 
produced similar results. (Saffer and Grossman 1987a, Table 2) When this paper was written, the federal beer tax 
had last been raised in 1951, to $9/barrel ($0.33/six-pack); the authors estimate that if the federal government had 
continually raised the tax to offset inflation, this would have saved the lives of 1,022 18−20-year-olds in the late 
1970s (Saffer and Grossman 1987a, p. 374). 
As Dee (1999, p. 304) points out, the apparent tax impact looks unrealistically large when you consider that only 
about half of traffic fatalities involve alcohol. An 18.5% reduction in fatalities among 18−20’s and 21−24’s means 
twice that among alcohol-related fatalities; a 40% reduction seems extraordinary for a $1 tax increase on a six-
pack that goes for some $7.50. On the other hand, the subtleties just noted in the pattern of the results across age 
groups do cohere with the interpretation of these results as tax impacts. It is hard to be certain what this study’s 
results mean, beyond that they are suggestive of impact. 
6.2.2. Dee (1999), “State alcohol policies, teen drinking and traffic fatalities,” Journal of Public Economics 
Dee (1999) is one of several contemporaneous papers to challenge earlier findings that beer taxes prevent traffic 
deaths.35 At least one in this new crop, Young and Likens (2000), was supported by beer industry funding.36 
Dee lodges several criticisms. He starts by working with a novel outcome variable, self-reported drinking behavior 
from nationwide surveys of high school seniors conducted by a group called Monitoring the Future. Examining 
data for 1977−92, he finds that when a state raised its minimum drinking age from 18, heavy drinking among 
seniors fell 8.4%. But beer tax hikes made little difference. (Dee 1999, p. 291.) Dee argues that the first finding 
shows that the surveys produces more than random noise, which makes the second finding more credible. 
However, I wonder whether the results merely show that raising the drinking age had more impact on teenagers’ 
conceptions of the “right” answers to questions about their drinking. It would be surprising if outlawing drinking 
for 18-year-olds did not cause self-censoring. A beer tax hike would not do that. This theory can also explain Dee’s 
survey-based results. 
Dee then switches to a more common outcome variable, government-tabulated traffic deaths. He shows that 
drinking age increases are associated more reliably with lower traffic deaths than is raising the beer tax. His most 
rigorous regressions control not only for fixed effects for each state but straight-line trends. Thus, if some 
unidentified factor is driving both alcohol policy and traffic deaths, creating a false appearance of a direct causal 
link between them, this will be removed to the extent that its effects change at a constant rate over time—rather 
than, as with fixed effects, being merely constant over a time. (Constant rate of change of effect is more general 
than constant effect because the constant rate could just be zero, leading to constant effect.) This controlling for 
state-specific trends undoes the beer tax impact result, even flipping the tax-fatality association to positive. But 
raising the minimum drinking age to 21 continues to reduce death rates. (Dee 1999, Table 4, last column.) 
Dee acknowledges that this constant-rate-of-change test is perhaps too tough in that it leaves the beer tax little 
variation with which to distinguish itself from all the controls. But then he administers what is perhaps the coup de 
grâce. He disaggregates the results by time of day of crash. Since, he states, the share of crashes that involve 
alcohol is 3.4−7.5 times higher at night (Dee 1999, p. 311), alcohol policies should affect total nighttime traffic 
fatalities much more than proportionally. For the policy change of raising the drinking age to 21, this proves so, 
with the impact coefficient 2.3 times higher by night. For the beer tax, the ratio is only 1.4. (Table 5, middle 
 
34 Coefficients in Saffer and Grossman (187a, Table 2) are semi-elasticities with respect to taxes in 1967 dollars per case (24 12-
ounce bottles). Conversion to 2014 dollars per six-pack multiples by 33.4 / 236.736 × 4 = 0.564. See footnote 28. 
35 Earlier studies also finding strong effects include Chaloupka, Saffer, and Grossman (1993) and Ruhm (1996). Other critical 
studies of Dee’s (1999) vintage are Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen (1999) and Young and Likens (2000). 
36 Conversation with Douglas Young, April 8, 2015. 
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column; pp. 311−13.) Dee concludes that something other than causality from taxes to traffic deaths is driving the 
beer tax results, because otherwise they make little sense.  
In my view, Dee succeeds in casting some doubt on earlier findings. Yet the criticisms also feel a bit strained. 
Raising the minimum drinking age to 21 also has less impact at night than Dee’s argument suggests it should: 2.3 
is outside the 3.4−7.5 range. And controlling for state-specific trends with a time dimension of 16 years is 
extremely demanding. 
6.2.3. Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2006), “Alcohol prices, consumption, and traffic fatalities,” Southern Economic 
Journal 
This paper adds an unexpected coda to the beer tax−traffic death subliterature. Sharing a coauthor with one of 
the skeptical circa-2000 studies (Young and Likens 2000), it concludes more hopefully on the benefits of alcohol 
taxation. It also introduces a smart methodological innovation. Yet the authors conclude with a caution about the 
reliability of the entire subliterature. 
Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2006) technically violates one of my quality criteria, by looking at the impact of 
prices rather than taxes—but there is no violation in spirit. For they draw the causal chain, 
 Alcohol taxes → Alcohol prices → Alcohol sales → Traffic deaths, 
and then use taxes to instrument prices. (On this concept, see my review of the mortality-fertility link.) They do the 
same with alcohol sales. Their instrumented regressions can be depicted as 
 Alcohol taxes → Alcohol prices → Traffic deaths 
 Alcohol taxes → Alcohol sales → Traffic deaths, 
where the rightmost arrows are of primary interest. Each of these gives insight into the full causal chain. The 
assumption required to interpret Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz’s correlations as causation is the same as needed in 
studies that regress outcomes directly on taxes: namely, that alcohol tax changes are exogenous after 
conditioning on controls.37 
Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2006, Table 2) start by demonstrating the importance their instrumentation. Non-
instrumented regressions of traffic fatality rates on an index of alcohol prices (not just for price of beer, the 
beverage of interest in other traffic fatality studies) produce positive coefficients, about half of which are 
statistically significant. The naïve interpretation: a higher price for booze causes more accidents. But instrumenting 
prices with taxes flips these results even as it puts them on firmer ground. After all, it seems, higher prices reduce 
accidents. Perhaps when there is no instrumentation, reverse causality obscures this connection, with higher local 
demand for alcohol raising local prices. Or perhaps for some other reason, alcohol costs more in states where 
traffic accidents happen more. 
Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2006, Tables 3 & 4) find that a tax-driven 10% alcohol price increase cuts the 
accident rate by 6.9% on weekend nights and by 3.9% at other times. Among teens (actually, 16−20-year-olds), 
the numbers are reversed, at 3.5% and 9.3%. A tax-driven 10% alcohol sales reduction lowers the accident rate by 
10.8% on weekend nights and 11.1% otherwise, and 10.2% and 14.1% just among teens. Since these four numbers 
for the impact of a 10% sales reduction are roughly twice their counterparts for a 10% price increase, this suggests 
that a 10% price increase saves about the same number of lives as a 5% sales decrease; from there, it is a short 
step to conclude that a 5% sales drop happens when there is a 10% price increase. Working more precisely, Young 
 
37 Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2006, Table A1) document very high first-stage 𝑅2s, so bias from instrument weakness seems 
unlikely. 
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and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2006, p. 698) compute an alcohol price-sales elasticity of −0.51, which is in line with the 
meta-analytic estimates discussed early in this review. 
Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz close by doubting their results. Perhaps their control set is too rich for the sample 
size, so that near-collinearity among some variables leads to odd results. For when they drop controls relating to 
religion and the importance of tourism in a state’s economy—whose coefficients are either insignificant or 
surprising in sign—the impacts of a price change fall by about half, and by about three-quarters among teens 
(their Table 5, first row), even if they remain statistically distinct from zero. 
The authors may be too hard on their work. Several of their criticisms, such as that the impacts appear implausibly 
large (pp. 700−01), refer to the regressions run before those suspect controls are dropped. Nevertheless, taken in 
the context of an internally contradictory subliterature, it is hard to end our survey highly confident that alcohol 
taxes have significantly cut traffic deaths. 
7. On long-term effects 
The literature persuades me that raising alcohol taxes reduces deaths from alcohol-related diseases, notably 
cirrhosis. However, key studies such as Wagenaar, Maldonado-Molina, and Wagenaar (2009) on Alaska, Cook and 
Tauchen (1982) on US states generally, and Koski et al. (2007) on Finland persuade precisely by showing quick 
impacts. And their focus on the short-term leaves the long-term impacts less clear. This is not a criticism: as I have 
argued, long-term impacts are harder to prove (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002, p.173). 
In the absence of certainty, what is the most plausible prior? One the on hand, the benefits of an alcohol tax 
increase almost surely swell with time. Cirrhosis, for example, progresses over decades. If a higher price for alcohol 
slows the progression from near-death to death, which is what the studies are detecting, then it ought also to 
slow the progression at all stages. On the other hand, many studies suggest that moderate drinking, as compared 
to abstention, reduces coronary heart disease and other ailments (Fekjӕr 2013, p. 2015). Alcohol tax increases may 
well impede this apparently healthy moderation. The harm per person might be much smaller than the benefit per 
person among heavy drinkers of a tax hike, but the population harmed could be far larger. And this effect might 
play out purely in the long-term, so that it is missed in the studies favored here. In principle, this leaves the sign of 
net long-term impact ambiguous. 
A full review of the relevant epidemiological literature on moderate drinking is beyond the scope of this 
document. However, an initial scan leaves me reasonably confident that tax increases save lives in the long run 
too. The reasons: 
• No randomized trials have checked on the benefits of moderate drinking (Holmes et al. 2014, p. 4). 
• The belief in such benefits derives from non-experimental, observational studies, whose claims to causal 
identification make them akin to the alcohol tax studies passed over for low credibility in this review. In 
epidemiology, as in economics, observational studies have come under a shadow in the last decade or so, 
as randomized trials have upended established doctrines such as the belief that hormone replacement 
therapy reduces heart disease and cancer (Writing Group for the Women's Health Initiative Investigators 
2002). 
• A new generation of Mendelian randomization studies challenges the conventional wisdom on moderate 
drinking, albeit not with the overwhelming force that conventional randomized trials would (Davey Smith 
and Ebrahim 2003, p. 10). Mendelian randomization studies strive to exploit the randomness inherent in 
sexual reproduction as well as the now-low cost of gene sequencing, in order to fashion natural 
experiments. For example, if a mutation reducing the ability to metabolize alcohol, and thus the 
propensity to drink, is randomly distributed in a population, then whether one carries zero, one, or two 
copies of that gene can instrument for drinking in a study of drinking’s sequelae. In fact, genes are not 
distributed with perfect randomness, and can affect health through multiple pathways, so Mendelian 
randomization does not produce experiments as close to perfect as a conventional randomized trial 
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(Thomas and Conti 2004; Davey Smith and Ebrahim 2003, pp. 13−17). Nevertheless, that these studies 
have generally failed to find benefit from moderate drinking in comparison to no drinking creates serious 
doubts about traditional observational studies. A meta-analysis of Mendelian-randomized alcohol studies, 
aggregating data from 261,991 people of European descent, found that carriers of a particular variant 
gene for the alcohol dehydrogenase 1B enzyme drank 17% less (95% confidence interval 15.6−18.9%) and 
had 10% lower odds of coronary heart disease (95% confidence interval 4−14%; Holmes et al. 2014, p. 4). 
(The gene causes faster conversion of alcohol into toxic aldehyde in the blood stream.) Restricting the 
analysis to low, moderate, or heavy drinkers did not change the apparent impact (Holmes et al. 2014, p. 7). 
Even at low levels, more drinking did at least modest harm. 
• A study based on a telephone survey of more than 200,000 people in the US checked whether self-
reported drinking levels correlated with any of 30 demographic, social, and economic factors thought to 
contribute to cardiovascular disease, from age to poverty to less exercise to limited access to health care. 
Among light and moderate drinkers as a group, 27 of the 30 factors were correlated with drinking levels, 
and in the direction that could create a false appearance of moderate drinking leading to better health. 
For example, as people enter old age, they drink less and become more likely to die.38 (Naimi et al. 2005.) 
Presumably no observational study controls for all 27, and perhaps none needs to go quite that far since 
the factors are probably inter-correlated. Nevertheless, the study suggests that the endogeneity of 
moderate drinking to health is hard to eradicate from an observational study. 
In light of these facts, Occam’s Razor argues for a simple theory: the net marginal impact of drinking on health is 
negative at all levels; and moderate drinking is a marker for relative youth, affluence, and healthy habits rather 
than a cause of good health (IOGT-NTO and the Swedish Society of Medicine 2014; Chikritzhs et al. 2015). 
Pending high-quality evidence to the contrary, alcohol taxes should be presumed to save even more lives in the 
long run. 
8. Lives and years of life saved 
I worked to translate findings from the highest-powered study settings into more comparable and meaningful 
estimates of lives saved. (See table below.) For the US-based studies, I relied on my replication regressions since 
they have larger samples and, in the case of the Cook-Tauchen-style US panel study, are modified to study the 
same outcome—deaths not just from cirrhosis but also from alcohol poisoning and damage to organs aside from 
the liver. 
In Alaska, directly measured alcohol prices rose some 12% between 2002 and 2003. According to a regression 
modeled on the Alaska study, the alcohol-caused death rate among those 15 and up fell by 31% in the quarter 
after the tax increase, producing a mortality-price elasticity of roughly −2.7. I.e., for every 1% increase in alcohol 
price, deaths fell 2.7%. 
Moving to the panel context—studying 30 states at once—we find that a $1/gallon liquor tax increase (in 1967 
dollars), or an average of 5% of the retail price, led to a 17% reduction, for an elasticity of −3.4. Note that, for lack 
of price data for the entire study period, the price impact of the representative tax increase is not observed but is 
inferred from a comparison to the typical $20/gallon liquor price. To the extent that retailers more than passed on 
tax increases to customers (Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz 2002; Kenkel 2005), this calculation underestimates the 
typical price change, and overestimates the elasticity. 
Finally, in Finland, over-30 alcohol-caused mortality rose 16% among men and 31% among women after the 
alcohol price index plunged 18%, for elasticities of −0.75 and −1.36. (Here the impact numbers are simple changes 
rather than regression coefficients.) 
 
38 The analysis excluded respondents reported to be in poor health, in order to prevent unhealthy former heavy drinkers from 
contaminating the sample of non-drinkers. 
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Short-term impact of alcohol tax changes in highest-powered study settings 
Context Approximate price change 
Impact on deaths 
from alcohol-
caused diseases Price elasticity 
Alaska, 2002 +8% beer, +14% wine, 
+17% sprits, +12% overall 
−31% −2.7 
30 US states with private 
liquor retail, 1960−2004 
Benchmark: +$1/gal spirits 
(1967 $) ≈ +5% retail 
−17% −3.4 
Finland, 2004 −18% alcohol price index +16% men, +31% 
women 
−0.75 men, 
−1.36 women 
Sources: Alaska: Price changes based on Ponicki (2004, ACCRAdj.xls); overall change an average weighted by 2002 
consumption of gallons of pure ethanol (LaVallee, Kim, and Yi 2014). Impact on alcohol-caused deaths from a 
Wagenaar, Maldonado-Molina, and Wagenaar (2009) log mortality replication regression like those reported 
earlier but with the dependent variable narrowed to alcohol-caused deaths as defined in that study. Price elasticity 
is −0.31/ln(1.12). US states: Population-weighted average price of a bottle of J&B scotch whiskey for the sample 
was equivalent to about $20/gallon (1967 dollars; Ponicki 2004, ACCRAdj.xls). Impact on alcohol-caused deaths 
reported in Cook and Tauchen (1982) log mortality replication. Price elasticity is −0.167/ln(1.05). Finland: Change in 
alcohol price index from FRED series CP0210FIM086NEST. Impacts from Herttua, Mäkelä, and Marikainen (2008, 
Table 1). Elasticities are ln(1.16)/ln(1-.18) and ln(1.31)/ln(1-.18). 
 
We can link this rather wide range of elasticities, 1−3 in absolute value, to tallies of alcohol-caused deaths, which I 
calculate at 23,000 in the US and 72,000 in all western industrial countries in 2010 (WHO).39 In the US, raising 
alcohol prices by 10% would cut the death toll by 9−25% or 2,000−6,000/year.40 Across these industrial countries, 
6,500−18,000 deaths/year would be averted. 
How many years of life a tax hike would save is a more complicated matter. Perhaps immediately after a tax 
increase the lives saved would be of people still close to death, so that years of life saved would seem modest. But 
if progression of alcohol-caused diseases slowed at all stages of those diseases, then the lives of (would-be) heavy 
drinkers of all ages would be lengthened, even if this would not show up in mortality statistics for decades. So it 
appears reasonable to assume that a permanent tax increase—if sustained against inflation—would reduce years 
of life lost proportionally to deaths. In the US, the CDC estimated that alcohol-caused chronic conditions cost 22.6 
years of life per death in 2001 (CDC 2004, Table).41 Applying that to our figure of 23,000 US deaths in 2010 
suggests that a 10% tax-induced alcohol price increase would save 48,000−130,000 years of life for each year it 
was sustained. 
9. Conclusion 
Despite weaknesses in the majority of studies—the ones not reviewed in depth here because they do not exploit 
natural experiments—and despite seeming disagreements among the studies given attention here, we can be 
reasonably confident that taxing alcohol reduces drinking in general and problem drinking in particular. The 
reasons are several: 
1. Common sense and empirical economics say that people usually buy less of a thing when its price goes 
up. Of course there are caveats: raise the alcohol tax enough and an illicit industry will take root and 
perhaps increase supply as it exploits economies of scale and learning-by-doing. And sometimes tax 
 
39 The coding definition of “alcohol-caused” is from Maldonado-Molina and Wagenaar (2010, table 2). It excludes “alcohol-
related” deaths, which have codes that do not fully attribute alcohol as the underlying cause, yet for which it often is. 
40 Given elasticity bounds of 1 and 3, the calculations are 1– exp(ln 1.1 × (– 1))  =  9% and 1– exp(ln 1.1 × (– 3))  = 25%. 
41 The definition of alcohol-caused deaths used in CDC (2004) results in 788,005 years of potential life lost and 34,833 deaths. 
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increase extract monopoly or other rents from suppliers, and are not passed on to consumers. But the 
assumption that taxes affect sales is a responsible starting point. 
2. Most studies find the expected negative correlation between alcohol prices and total drinking. Even 
Nelson (2013, 2014a), in his skepticism, agrees. I like his publication bias−adjusted elasticity estimates: 
−0.29 for beer, −0.46 for wine, −0.54 for spirits, −0.49 for total alcohol (Nelson 2013a). 
3. It is hard to construct compelling alternative explanations for this correlation. 
4. The evidence suggests that the tax-consumption link carries over to problem drinking. Alcohol-related 
deaths rose in Alaska in 2002 (Wagenaar, Maldonado-Molina, and Wagenaar 2009) and Finland in 2004 
(Koski et al. 2007), as did drunk driving in Finland, at least temporarily (Mäkelä and Österberg 2009). Panel 
studies such as Cook and Tauchen (1982), and my extensions thereof, find similar results across many 
states and decades. In Switzerland, self-reported drinking problems rose (Mohler-Kuo et al. 2004), about 
as much in the long run among heavy drinkers as in the general population (Gmel et al. 2007).  
5. The evidence for impacts on sexually transmitted diseases and traffic fatalities looks weaker. 
6. While some studies of natural experiments in taxation do not find impacts on alcohol-related mortality—
notably, in Hong Kong and Denmark—and others detect it in a way that leaves room for doubt—in 
Florida and the U.S. as a whole—one observation can explain most of this seeming disagreement. The 
larger and cleaner the natural experiment, the more apt are studies to detect impacts on drinking. In the 
context of U.S. state studies, the largest change was in Alaska in 2002, and that is where the identification 
of impacts is most compelling (Wagenaar, Maldonado-Molina, and Wagenaar 2009). Something similar 
goes for the tax cuts in Nordic nations, with Finland the unhappy standout. In Hong Kong, where no 
impacts were found, the tax cut hardly produced changes in the price series that were indistinguishable 
from long-term trends when relying on surveys 5−6 years apart. Thus the evidence base taken as a whole 
is most easily explained by a dose-response story. The bigger the tax change, the greater the statistical 
power to detect it. 
7. The idea that moderate drinking is healthier than no drinking is based on observational epidemiological 
studies, which as a type have fallen somewhat into disrepute in recent decades, and are less persuasive as 
to causality than the tax impact studies relied on here. It therefore seems unlikely that alcohol tax 
increases do net harm in the long run by discouraging moderate drinking. Rather, the benefits of slowing 
the progression of diseases such as cirrhosis accumulate over time, and probably dominate the overall 
long-term effect. 
8. Estimates from the highest-powered study settings suggest an elasticity of mortality with respect to price 
of −1 to −3. A 10% price increase in the US would, according to this estimate, save 2,000−6,000 lives and 
48,000−130,000 years of life each year. 
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